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Abstract
In an age when cybersecurity vulnerabilities can be used as a pretext for a blockade, as in 
the case of Qatar prompted by a hack of the Qatar News Agency, it becomes incumbent upon 
states to consider legislating the capability maturity measurement and the development of 
their cybersecurity programs across the community. This paper proposes a Qatar Cybersecu-
rity Capability Maturity Model (Q-C2M2) with a legislative framework. The paper discusses 
the origin, purpose and characteristics of a capability maturity model and its adoption in 
the cybersecurity domain. Driven by a thematic analysis under the document analysis meth-
odology, the paper examines existing globally recognized cybersecurity capability maturity 
models and Qatar’s cybersecurity framework using publicly available documents. This paper 
also conducts a comparative analysis of existing cybersecurity capability maturity models 
in light of the Qatari cybersecurity framework, including a comparative analysis of cyber-
security capability maturity model literature. The comparative document analysis helped 
identify gaps in the existing Qatar National Information Assurance Policy and specifically the 
Qatar National Information Assurance Manual. The proposed Q-C2M2 aims to enhance Qa-
tar’s cybersecurity framework by providing a workable Q-C2M2 with a legislative component 
that can be used to benchmark, measure and develop Qatar’s cybersecurity framework. 
The Q-C2M2 proposes the USERS domains consisting of Understand, Secure, Expose, Recover 
and Sustain. Each domain consists of subdomains, under which an organization can create 
cybersecurity activities at initial benchmarking. The Q-C2M2 uses the following five levels to 
measure the cybersecurity capability maturity of an organization: Initiating, Implementing, 
Developing, Adaptive and Agile.
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ملّخ�ص
في هذا الع�شر، يجب على الدول و�شع الت�شريعات التي تقي�س قدرات اأمنها ال�شيبراني وتطوير برامجها، بالأخ�س 
عندما ُت�شتخدم ثغرات الأمن ال�شيبراني كذريعة لفر�س الح�شار، كما هو الحال في دولة قطر، وذلك بعد اأن تم 
اختراق وكالة الأنباء القطرية. يقترح هذا البحث نموذًجا لتعزيز قدرات الأمن ال�شيبراني (2M2C-Q) في دولة 
قطر �شمن اإطار ت�شريعي. ويتناول البحث نموذًجا اأ�شيًلا لتعزيز قدرات الأمن ال�شيبراني مع ت�شليط ال�شوء على 
غر�شه وخ�شائ�شه واعتماده. كما يعر�س البحث نماذًجا لتعزيز قدرات الأمن ال�شيبراني الحالية والمعترف بها 
عالمًيا، ودرا�شة عن الأمن ال�شيبراني في دولة قطر با�شتخدام الوثائق المتاحة، وذلك بناء على منهجية التحليل 
المو�شوعي للوثائق. كما يقدم هذا البحث تحليًلا مقارًنا لنماذج تعزيز قدرات الأمن ال�شيبراني في �شوء الأمن 
ال�شيبراني القطري. وفي هذا الإطار، �شاعد التحليل المقارن للوثائق في تحديد الثغرات الموجودة في �شيا�شة تاأمين 
المعلومات  الوطنية  القطرية  ب�شكل  عام،  ودليل  تاأمين  المعلومات  الوطنية  القطرية  ب�شكل  خا�س.  يهدف  نموذج 
(2M2C-Q) المقترح اإلى تعزيز اإطار عمل الأمن ال�شيبراني في قطر من خلال توفير نموذج عملي مع عن�شر 
ت�شريعي يمكن ا�شتخدامه لقيا�س اأداء الأمن ال�شيبراني وتطويره. كما يقترح هذا النموذج مجالت للم�شتخدمين 
”SRESU” التي تتكون من الفهم (dnatsrednU)، والأمن (eruceS)، والك�شف (esopxE)، وال�شتعادة (-eR
revoc)، وال�شتدامة (niatsuS)، حيث يت�شمن كل مجال مجالت فرعية، والتي بموجبها يمكن للموؤ�ش�شة اإن�شاء 
اأن�شطة للاأمن ال�شيبراني عند التقييم الأولي. ي�شتخدم نموذج (2M2C-Q) الم�شتويات الخم�شة التالية لقيا�س تعزيز 
قدرات الأمن ال�شيبراني للمنظمات: البدء والتطبيق والتطوير والتكيف والمرونة.
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للاقتبا�س: براون ر.، «نحو نموذج لتعزيز كفاءة الأمن ال�شيبراني في قطر �شمن الإطار الت�شريعي»، المجلة الدولية للقانون، المجلد 8102، 
العدد الرابع الخا�س بالح�شار
8000.9102.sej/71192.01/gro.iod//:sptth
© 9102، براون، الجهة المرخ�س لها: دار ن�شر جامعة قطر. تم ن�شر هذه المقالة البحثية بوا�شطة الو�شول الحر ووفًقا ل�شروط
0.4 YB CC esnecil noitubirttA snommoC evitaerC. هذه الرخ�شة تتيح حرية اإعادة التوزيع، التعديل، التغيير، وال�شتقاق 
من العمل، �شواء اأكان ذلك لأغرا�س تجارية اأو غير تجارية، طالما ين�شب العمل الأ�شلي للموؤلفين.
7102 rebotcO 22 :dettimbuS
8102 hcraM 5 :detpeccA
30 رطق ةعماج رش�ن راد ،راش�لحاب ص�الخا عبارلا ددعلا ،2018 دلجلما ،نوناقلل ةيلودلا ةلجلما
Introduction
On June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt cut off diplomatic ties with Qatar. Saudi 
Arabia closed its land border and the blockading countries closed access to its airspace and ports of 
entry to Qatar.1 Later, the blockading countries prohibited their financial institutions from transact-
ing with Qatari banks and from trading in Qatari riyals.2 One month prior to the blockade, hackers 
had breached the state-owned Qatari News Agency (QNA) website3 with little effort, using a kiddie 
script, due to the site’s lax security.4 Within minutes of the hack,5 fake remarks that the hackers 
misattributed to the emir of Qatar were disseminated online through social media and news outlets 
from the blockading countries.6 According to The Washington Post, U.S. intelligence agencies at-
tributed the hacking to the UAE.7 The fake remarks on the QNA website were used by the blockading 
countries as the initial pretext for imposing the blockade on Qatar.8 
Geopolitics aside, the blockade demonstrated the interconnectedness of cybersecurity and critical 
infrastructures, a phenomenon that Li and Huang have referred to as “pervasive cyber interdepen-
dencies,”9 which have emerged from the automation and computerization of critical infrastructures. 
A critical infrastructure has been defined as an element of a system that is necessary to maintain 
societal function, health and physical security and social and economic welfare.10 Critical infrastruc-
tures include cyber interdependent sectors like food, transportation, information and communica-
tion technologies, energy and utilities, financial systems, healthcare and government.11 
In the case of the Qatar blockade, multiple cybersecurity attacks on a state-owned media’s infor-
mation and communication technologies became the pretext for trade and transportation blockades 
that affected Qatar’s financial systems and food supply. According to Miron and Muita,12 there are 
1. Tamar Kiblawi et al., Qatar rift: Saudi, UAE, Bahrain, Egypt cut diplomatic ties, CNN, July 27, 2017, http://edition.cnn.
com/2017/06/05/middleeast/saudi-bahrain-egypt-uae-qatar-terror/index.html (accessed 16 October 2017); BBC, Qatar cri-
sis: What you need to know, BBC News, July 19, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40173757 (accessed 
October 16, 2017). 
2. Tom Arnold, Hadeel Al Sayegh, & Tom Finn, UPDATE 3-Qatari riyal under pressure as Saudi, UAE banks delay Qatar deals, 
CNBC, June 6, 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/06/reuters-america-update-3-qatari-riyal-under-pressure-as-saudi-
uae-banks-delay-qatar-deals.html (accessed October 16, 2017). 
3. Hackers commandeered the Qatar News Agency (QNA) website on May 23–24 and planted misattributed statements, pur-
portedly delivered by Sheikh Tamim during the latest graduation ceremony held for Qatari conscripts. See George Doumar 
et al., Crisis in the Gulf Cooperation Council: Challenges and Prospects (Arab Center Washington DC, 2017) 7.
4. Charlie Osborne, Script kiddies delight at ‘easy’ hack which caused Qatar diplomatic crisis, Zero Day Net, June 8, 2017, 
http://www.zdnet.com/article/it-was-easy-to-cause-the-qatar-diplomatic-crisis/ (accessed October 15, 2017).  
5. Stupendous hubris…and its damage, in George Doumar et al., Crisis in the Gulf Cooperation Council: Challenges and 
Prospects (Arab Center Washington DC, 2017), 44 (stating that “within minutes of the publication of the fake statements by 
Qatar’s Emir, Saudi Arabian television stations and individuals were summoned into action against Doha and its leadership”).
6. Ben Westcott, Richard Roth, & Ralph Ellis, Qatar says embargoing nations behind news agency hack, CNN, July 27, 2017, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2017/07/20/middleeast/qatar-ambassador-un-demands/index.html. Interestingly, five weeks be-
fore the hacking there were thirteen separate opinion pieces attacking Qatar in U.S. media. Doumar et al. (n 3). 
7. Karen DeYoung & Ellen Nakashima, UAE orchestrated hacking of Qatari government sites, sparking regional upheaval, 
according to U.S. intelligence officials, The Washington Post, July 16, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/na-
tional-security/uae-hacked-qatari-government-sites-sparking-regional-upheaval-according-to-us-intelligence-officials/2017/
07/16/00c46e54-698f-11e7-8eb5-cbccc2e7bfbf_story.html?utm_term=.af380f2295ce (accessed October 15, 2017).
8. Financial Times, The blockade against Qatar damages all sides, July 23, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/213c-
fae6-6e28-11e7-bfeb-33fe0c5b7eaa?mhq5j=e7 (accessed October 14, 2017).
9. Li Xiao-Juan & Huang Li-Zhen, Vulnerability and interdependency of critical infrastructure: A review, Third Internation-
al Conference on Infrastructure Systems and Services: Next Generation Infrastructure Systems for Eco-Cities (INFRA), 1–5 
(2010).
10. Jose M. Yusta, Gabriel J. Correa & Roberto Lacal-Arántegui, Methodologies and applications for critical infrastructure 
protection: State-of-the-art, 39(10) Energy Policy 6100–611 (2011); Walter Miron & Kevin Muita, Cybersecurity capability 
maturity models for providers of critical infrastructure, 4(10) Tech Innovation Management Rev 33–39 (2014).
11. Miron and Muita (n 10). 
12. Ibid.
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three types of attacks on critical infrastructures: (1) a direct infrastructure effect,13 (2) an indirect 
infrastructure effect14 and (3) an exploitation of infrastructure.15 The Qatar cyberattack had, and 
continues to have as of the writing of this paper, an indirect infrastructure effect16 on Qatar. The 
cyberattack created a cascading disruption on trade and transportation, and accompanying financial 
consequences for the Qatari government, society and economy through public and private reactions 
to the attack, such as the initial panic buying caused by the spread of false news.17 
For Qatar, the blockade was a test of resilience,18 a wakeup call for enhancing cybersecurity and 
self-sufficiency. With Qatar’s cybersecurity strategy up for reconsideration in 2018 when the ac-
tion plan will be redrawn,19 it is timely to reexamine Qatar’s cybersecurity capabilities. This paper 
proposes a cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2) for Qatar with a legislative framework. 
Section II of the paper begins with a discussion of the capability maturity model’s origin, purpose, 
and characteristics and its adoption in the cybersecurity domain. Section III conducts a document 
analysis of existing C2M2s, with particular focus on the internationally recognized C2M2s: the U.S. 
Department of Energy’s Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model20 (U.S. DoE C2M2) and its progeny, 
the NIST Cybersecurity Framework21 (NIST Framework), the NICE-CMM22 and the CERT Resilience 
Management Model23 (CERT-RMM).
Part IV conducts a document analysis of Qatar’s cybersecurity framework using publicly available 
documents. In Section V, the paper conducts a comparative analysis of existing C2M2s in light of the 
Qatari cybersecurity framework, including a comparative analysis of C2M2 literature, a thematic 
analysis and a summary of the lessons learned from the comparisons. Borrowing from the best fea-
tures of existing C2M2s and considering Qatar’s cybersecurity framework, Section VI of the paper 
proposes a Qatari Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (Q-C2M2) with a legislative framework. 
While the paper does not aim to propose a fully drawn Q-C2M2, which would require further input 
from relevant cybersecurity stakeholders, the proposed Q-C2M2 provides a workable framework 
with a legislative component that improves the existing Qatari cybersecurity framework. Section 
VII discusses the legislative framework in more detail, weighing the need for a legislative mandate, 
the adoption of Q-C2M2, the role of the forthcoming CIIP law, and the embedded legal framework 
13. Involves a “cascading disruption or arrest of the functions of critical infrastructures or key assets through direct attacks 
on a critical node, system, or function.” Ibid.
14. Involves a “cascading disruption and financial consequences for government, society, and economy through public and 
private sector reactions to an attack.” Ibid.
15. Involves the “exploitation of elements of a particular infrastructure to disrupt or destroy another target.” Ibid.
16. Myriam Dunn, Information risks and countermeasures: Problems, prospects, and challenges of securing the information 
infrastructure, in Theodor Winkler, Anja H Ebnöther, Ernst M Felberbauer (eds), 6th International Security Forum: Proceed-
ings of the Conference (Peter Lang, 2005), 78.
17. Krishnadev Calamur, What just happened with Qatar? The Atlantic, June 5, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/news/
archive/2017/06/what-just-happened-with-qatar/529128/ (accessed October 15, 2017).
18. David Stewart, Qatar’s resilience – a lesson for all on how to respond positively to a crisis, Gulf Times, October 10, 
2017, http://www.gulf-times.com/story/566847/Qatar-s-resilience-a-lesson-for-all-on-how-to-resp (accessed October 17, 
2017).
19. Qatar National Cybersecurity Strategy, May 2014, at 13, http://www.motc.gov.qa/en/documents/document/nation-
al-cyber-security-strategy (accessed 13 October 2017). (“QNCS”).
20. U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2) 
v.1.1., February 2014, https://energy.gov/oe/services/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-capability-maturity-model-c2m2-pro-
gram/cybersecurity (accessed October 16, 2017) (“U.S. DoE”).
21. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Framework for improving
critical infrastructure cybersecurity, February 12, 2014, https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework (accessed 17 October 2017).
22. National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE), Cybersecurity capability maturity model, October 3, 2012, 
https://www.tdisecurity.com/about-tdi/cybersecurity_education.pdf (accessed October 17, 2017). 
23. Richard A. Caralli et al., CERT® Resilience Management Model, Version 1.2, Software Engineering Institute, February 
2016, https://www.cert.org/resilience/products-services/cert-rmm/ (accessed October 17, 2017). 
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within the Q-C2M2 design. This paper argues for a legislatively mandated Q-C2M2 under a national 
security interest viewpoint. In an age when cybersecurity can be used as a pretext for a blockade, 
it becomes incumbent upon states to consider legislating the capability maturity measurement and 
development of their cybersecurity programs. 
I. Capability Maturity Model and Cybersecurity
This section provides a general overview of the capability maturity model (CMM) with a discussion 
of its origin, purpose and characteristics. The section then discusses the applicability of the CMM to 
the cybersecurity field. 
A. Origin and Purpose of the Capability Maturity Model
The Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon University originally developed the capa-
bility maturity model (CMM) in the 1980s.24 SEI first applied the CMM to create a simple assessment 
tool for measuring and thereafter improving the quality and progressive software process capabili-
ties of software engineering.25 Since then, other fields and industries, ranging from digital forensics 
to public management, have been inspired and have tailored the CMM to fit the unique needs of their 
discipline.26 
The CMM measures the maturity of an organization’s process capabilities through sequential levels 
that aim to improve the capabilities by achieving a targeted state.27 Typically, a CMM consists of 
two components: (1) a means of sequentially measuring and describing hierarchical progression and 
(2) criteria for measuring the capabilities through conditions, processes, or application targets.28 A 
CMM guides organizations by providing a set of criteria and a means of measuring progress through 
the maturity levels.29 Therefore, an organization must undergo a number of process and quality im-
provements in several practice areas to achieve higher levels of capability in the evolutionary stages 
of the CMM.30 As a process model, a CMM identifies a structured collection of best practices in the 
field, as proven by experience that describes the characteristics of effective processes.31 According 
to Buss, the stages of a CMM “are determined by research evidence, expert opinion, best practices 
and evaluations.”32 
24. Angel Marcelo Rea-Guamán et al., Comparative study of cybersecurity capability maturity models, in Antonia Mas et al. 
(eds), Software Process Improvement and Capability Determination, SPICE Conference 2017, Communications in Computer 
and Information Science, vol. 770 (Springer, 2017); Angel Marcelo Rea-Guamán et al., Maturity models in cybersecurity: A 
systematic review, 2017 12th Iberian Conference on Information Systems and Technologies (CISTI) (2017), 1–6.
25. Oscar González-Rojas, Dario Correal & Manuel Camargo, ICT capabilities for supporting collaborative work on business 
processes within the digital content industry, 80 Computers in Industry 16–29 (2016); Jörg Becker, Ralf Knackstedt & Jens 
Pöppelbuß, Developing maturity models for IT Management: A procedure model and its application, 1(3) Bus & Inf Systems 
Engineering 213–222 (2009); Gerrit Lahrmann et al., Inductive design of maturity models: Applying the Rasch algorithm for 
design science research, Service-Oriented Perspectives: Design Science Research, 176–191 (Springer, 2011); Roy Wendler, 
The maturity of maturity model research: A systematic mapping study, 54(12) Information and Software Tech 1317–1339 
(2012).
26. See generally, Ronald L. Krutz, Methodology for assessing the maturity and capability of an organization’s computer 
forensics processes, U.S. Patent Application 10/952537 (2006) (digital forensics); The adoption and transformation of 
capability maturity models in government, in Encyclopedia of Information Science and Technology (4th ed. 2018) (public 
management); see also Rea-Guamán et al. (n 22).
27. Becker et al. (n 23); Lahrmaan et al. (n 23); Paulk, Mark C. et al., Capability maturity model version 1.1, 10(4) IEEE 
Software 18–27 (1993).
28. Wendler (n 23); Siponen, Mikko, Towards maturity of information security maturity criteria: Six lessons learned from 
software maturity criteria, 10(5) Inf Management & Comp Security 210–224 (2002).
29. Ibid.
30. Buss (n 24). 
31. Rea-Guamán et al. (n 22).
32. Buss (n 24) 1.
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According to Lahrmaan et al., a CMM’s output can provide valuable pragmatic advice and guidance to 
decision makers on how to improve their capabilities.33 A CMM, however, must be adaptive to remain 
relevant and useful,34 especially because there is no universally agreed upon standard for CMM devel-
opment and evaluation.35 The CMM should follow an iterative process in development and evaluation 
and should include a means for self-assessment by relevant stakeholders and practitioners.36 
Despite the CMM’s significant contributions to improving quality and process, CMMs have been crit-
icized for lacking a theoretical underpinning, for being too costly to implement, and for being sub-
jective and unsuccessful in some organizations.37 Further, because there is no agreed upon standard 
for developing and evaluating CMMs, it may be necessary to create an organization to study and vet a 
CMM’s application.38 Regardless, a number of public and private organizations, from Accenture to the 
U.S. Navy, have adopted CMMs to enhance their existing processes and raise awareness on the need 
for process improvement.39 One field in which CMM is continuing to thrive is cybersecurity.
B. Applicability of the Capability Maturity Model in Cybersecurity
CMMs are germane in determining the capability maturity of cybersecurity organizations.40 In cy-
bersecurity, a CMM is typically referred to as a Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2). As 
stated by Chapin and Akridge, an organization’s unsystematic implementation of cybersecurity prac-
tices increases risks and vulnerabilities.41 A C2M2 can guide cybersecurity organizations to implement 
a consistent application, measurement, and improvement of information security controls; and to 
mitigate against risks and threats to critical infrastructures. A number of governments, such as those 
of the United States and Italy, have developed C2M2s, some with the aim of creating a national or 
international standard for cybersecurity capability maturity.42 In Italy, the Framework Nazionale per 
la Cyber Security adopted a C2M2 approach based on the NIST Framework.43 In the United States, 
companies and government agencies, such as Intel and the U.S. Department of Energy, have adopted 
C2M2s.44 Sometimes compliance with such financial regulations as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the Unit-
ed States may dictate the need for a systematic method for assessing and reporting internal control 
maturity.45 By 2020, half of U.S. companies are expected to adopt C2M2s like the NIST Framework.46 
33. Lahrmaan et al. (n 23).
34. Ibid.
35. Buss (n 24); Lahrmaan et al. (n 23).
36. Buss (n 24); Lahrmaan et al. (n 23); Becker et al. (n 23).
37. Buss (n 24).
38. Ibid.
39. Uzoka, Faith-Michael E., A CMM assessment of information systems maturity levels in Botswana, 16 MIS Rev 53–84 
(2010). For a sample list of private and public organizations that have adopted the CMM, see CMMI Institute, Published 
appraisal results, https://sas.cmmiinstitute.com/pars/pars.aspx (accessed February 22, 2018).
40. Miron and Muita (n 10). 
41. D.A. Chapin & S. Akridge, How can security be measured? 2 Information Systems Control J 43–47 (2005).
42. Wendler (n 23); Rea-Guamán et al. (n 22).
43. Framework Nazionale per la Cyber Security, Il cybersecurity report 2016, 2016, http://www.cybersecurityframework.it/ 
(accessed 22 February 2018). Italy adopted a cybersecurity framework based on the U.S. NIST Framework, which is focused 
on critical infrastructure. 
44. Kip Boyle, International use of NIST Cybersecurity Framework, 2016, http://kipboyle.com/2016/05/internation-
al-use-of-nist-cybersecurity-framework/ (accessed 22 February 2018).
45. R.S. Debreceny, Re-engineering IT internal controls: Applying capability maturity models to the evaluation of IT con-
trols, IEEE, HICSS’06, Proceedings of the 39th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences 8: 196c–196c 
(2006).
46. Ibid.
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As is the case with CMMs in general, there is no universally accepted standard for C2M2s. Neverthe-
less, although a number of C2M2s were initially designed to protect critical infrastructures, C2M2s 
can be applied to public and private organizations of all sizes and sectors. State entities and private 
businesses alike need to establish cybersecurity governance, culture and data management pro-
cesses that adapt to the constantly evolving challenges posed by cybersecurity while maintaining 
minimal vulnerabilities to threats and ensuring an effective incident response and recovery.47 C2M2s 
can help organizations evaluate and improve the capabilities of cybersecurity programs and policies 
and elevate them to higher levels of maturity.48 In turn, various organizations have developed C2M2s 
tailored to their particular needs.49 The lack of a universal standard for C2M2s further necessitates 
designing a C2M2 to fit the needs of a particular organization within the context of a particular na-
tional policy. 
A C2M2 provides an organization with a structure that enables benchmarking of cybersecurity capa-
bilities against a framework of recognized best practices, thus creating a foundation for consistent 
and systematic evaluation.50 The C2M2 benchmark can help organizations assess the level of maturity 
of their cybersecurity practices and processes. Organizations can thereafter make comparisons of 
cybersecurity capabilities with other similarly situated organizations. Decision makers can also use 
the C2M2 as a guide to determine allocation of resources, prioritization and goal setting to support 
progression towards higher levels of capability maturity and the overall improvement in cybersecu-
rity.51 
C2M2s usually consist of three elements: (1) practice areas or domains, (2) objectives or indicators 
and (3) measures of maturity. A practice area or domain groups the common cybersecurity practices 
or processes of an organization. Each practice area or domain contains objectives that the organi-
zation must fulfill, and serves to visualize the progress towards the objectives.52 The measures of 
maturity determine the maturity level of an organization’s cybersecurity capabilities based on the 
quality of the practices, processes and policies concerning the objectives within a practice area or 
domain.53 Most C2M2s have four levels of maturity, ranging from minimal, ad hoc, and early adop-
tion of cybersecurity practices, processes, and policies; to intermediate documented cybersecurity 
practices, processes, and policies; to dynamic and adaptive cybersecurity practices, processes, and 
policies that can rapidly detect, respond, and recover from threats, risks, vulnerabilities, and orga-
nizational needs.54 
II. Document Analysis of Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Models
A comparative analysis of existing C2M2s is necessary to arrive at a better understanding of the dif-
ferences among the practice areas, objectives and measures of C2M2s. The comparative analysis will 
be useful for analyzing the Qatari policy on cybersecurity and for informing the proposal of a C2M2 
tailored for Qatar. 
47. Richard Adler, A dynamic capability maturity model for improving cyber security, 2013 IEEE International Conference on 
Technologies for Homeland Security (HST) (2014). 
48. U.S. DoE (n 17); Rea-Guamán et al. (n 22).
49. Rea-Guamán et al. (n 22).
50. Adler (n 43).
51. NICE (n 19); Rea-Guamán et al. (n 22).
52. Rea-Guamán et al. (n 22).
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
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A. Document Analysis Methodology
Because of the substantial practical benefits in terms of cost and time, and the lack of ethical 
constraints due to the public nature of the documents, outweighing the minimal risks of bias in the 
research, the author adopted a document analysis methodology to determine the content, level and 
areas of comparative inquiry. Document analysis is an accepted form of qualitative research in which 
the researcher interprets documents to give voice and meaning to an assessment topic.55 A document 
analysis methodology would add validity and reliability to a comparative analysis of existing C2M2s, 
the primary aim of this research. Additionally, in proposing a C2M2 for Qatar, the secondary aim of 
this research, a document analysis of publicly available Qatari cybersecurity documents would make 
the research more relevant and useful.56 Further, the paper will apply the diffusion of innovation 
theory to the proposed Qatari C2M2, as Miron and Muita have done.57 A document analysis of publicly 
available Qatari cybersecurity documents along with a comparative analysis with existing C2M2s 
will increase the proposed Qatari C2M2’s likelihood of success in attaining the following five factors 
in the diffusion of innovation theory: relative advantage, compatibility, simplicity, trialability and 
observability.
Document analysis requires coding content into themes and using a rubric to assess the documents.58 
For this paper, the author used types of documents widely recognized in document analysis method-
ology: public records of C2M2s, training materials, cybersecurity policy manuals, and peer-reviewed 
journals.59 The author used multiple sources for triangulation, corroboration and bias reduction.60 
The author began by creating a planned process that consisted of (1) identifying the documents, 
(2) assessing the documents, (3) acknowledging and addressing bias, (4) ensuring credibility and (5) 
addressing ethical issues.61 
Figure 1: Planned Process for Document Analysis
After gathering the documents, the author assessed the documents’ authenticity, developed an or-
ganizational and management plan, and explored the documents’ backgrounds, which included an 
analysis of tone, style, purpose and potential bias of the document’s author. In addressing bias, for 
example, the author considered the number of authors, the purpose for the document, the docu-
ment’s audience, and the potential subjectivity and bias of the document’s author(s). The author 
used thematic analysis to identify among the documents emerging themes, which the researcher 
coded and categorized.62 To maintain credibility and validity, the author of this paper maintained 
objectivity and avoided making assumptions about the documents and data.63 
 
55. Glenn A Bowen, Document analysis as a qualitative research method, 9(2) Qual Research J 27–40 (2009).
56. The use of publicly available documents will be sufficient for purposes of this paper. Non-publicly available documents 
in Qatar will not likely be generalized policies or frameworks about cybersecurity. There is, therefore, a very low risk that 
non-publicly available documents would have a significant impact on the research, unless Qatar has already adopted a 
C2M2 and has not made it public. According to Dr. Noora Fetais, director of KINDI, Q-CERT uses CMMI, but there is no other 
indication that a C2M2 is being used in Qatar. Noora Fetais, director of KINDI Computer Research Center, Qatar University, 
email correspondence (October 19, 2017) (copy on file with the author); Q-CERT, About Q-CERT, 2017, http://www.qcert.
org/about-q-cert (accessed October 18, 2017).
57. Miron and Muita (n 10).
58. Bowen (n 51).
59. Zina O’Leary, The Essential Guide to Doing Your Research Project (2nd ed., SAGE Publications, 2014).
60. Bowen (n 51).
61. O’Leary (n 54).
62. Bowen (n 51).
63. Ibid.
36 رطق ةعماج رش�ن راد ،راش�لحاب ص�الخا عبارلا ددعلا ،2018 دلجلما ،نوناقلل ةيلودلا ةلجلما
B. Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Models 
While the author conducted a content and thematic analysis of a number of C2M2s, this paper will 
only cover in depth the most relevant C2M2s and those that the cybersecurity field has recognized 
nationally and internationally. For example, the author did not give substantial treatment to early 
examples of C2M2s, such as the International Organization for Standardization’s Systems Security 
Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM);64 and C2M2s that have not received widespread 
recognition and adoption, such as the Maqasid al-Shari’ah C2M2.65 Instead, this paper focuses on 
comparing only the following four widely recognized66 C2M2 initiatives: (1) the U.S. DoE’s C2M2, 
(2) the NICE-CMM, (3) the CERT-RMM and (4) the NIST Framework. The author will discuss the main 
features of these four C2M2s with the aim of later conducting a comparative analysis based on the 
results of the document analysis. 
Table 1: Overview of Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Models
Model Name U.S. C2M2s NICE-CMM CERT-RMM NIST Framework
Organization U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy
 U.S. Department
of Homeland Se-
curity
Software Engineer-
(ing Institute (SEI
 U.S. National
Institute of Stan-
dards and Tech-
nology
Purpose any organiza-
tion
workforce planning any organization critical infrastruc-
ture
 Number of
Domains
10 3 26 22
Number of Ma-
turity Levels
4 4 3 4
1. U.S. DoE Approach: C2M2, ES-C2M2, ONG-C2M2
The U.S. Department of Energy collaborated with Carnegie Mellon University to create the Cyber-
security Capability Maturity Model (C2M2),67 the Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Ma-
turity Model (ES-C2M2),68 and the Oil and Natural Gas Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity 
Model (ONG-C2M2)69 in 2014.70 The U.S. DoE designed the three C2M2s to measure the sophistication 
64. Karen Ferraiolo, The Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM), International Systems Security 
Engineering Association (ISSEA), 2000, https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/conference-paper/2000/10/19/pro-
ceedings-of-the-23rd-nissc-2000/documents/papers/916slide.pdf (accessed October 12, 2017).
65. Jamaludin Ibrahim et al., A cybersecurity capability maturity model based on Maqasid Shari’ah (MS-C2M2), International 
Conference on Maqasid Al-Shari’ah in Public Policy and Governance (IAIS Malaysia, 2015).
66. See Rea-Guamán et al. (n 22).
67. U.S. DoE (n 17). 
68. U.S. Department of Energy, Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (ES-C2M2) v.1.1., February 
2014, https://energy.gov/oe/cybersecurity-capability-maturity-model-c2m2-program/electricity-subsector-cybersecurity 
(accessed October 17, 2017) (“U.S. DoE ES-C2M2”).
69. U.S. Department of Energy, Oil and Natural Gas Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (ONG-C2M2) v.1.1., 
February 2014, https://energy.gov/oe/cybersecurity-capability-maturity-model-c2m2-program/oil-and-natural-gas-subsec-
tor-cybersecurity (accessed October 17, 2017) (“U.S. DoE ONG-C2M2”).
70. The U.S. DoE developed the C2M2 from the precursor Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (ES-
C2M2) by removing sector-specific language. The Electricity Sector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (ES-C2M2) is tai-
lored to the energy subsector, particularly those supplying electric power. The ES-C2M2 includes the core C2M2, additional 
reference materials, and implementation guidance specifically tailored for the electricity subsector. Likewise, U.S. DoE de-
rived the Oil and Natural Gas Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (ONG-C2M2) from the ES-C2M2. The ONG-
C2M2 is tailored to the oil and natural gas subsector. A thematic analysis of the three documents shows that differences 
exist in the section of the documents providing sector-specific background and in the sector-specific examples used in the 
domains. As such, the author treated the C2M2, ES-C2M2, and the ONG-C2M2 as a unified group of C2M2 documents. U.S. 
DoE (n 17); Rea-Guamán et al. (n 22); U.S. DoE ES-C2M2 (n 63); U.S. DoE ONG-C2M2 (n 64); Rahul Gupta, The challenges and 
recommended steps to improve cybersecurity within industrial control systems, Wood Group Mustang, Petroleum and Power 
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and sustainability of cybersecurity programs. However, it is important to note that these C2M2s 
are voluntary public–private partnership programs.71 Because the original C2M2 was made for the 
electricity subsector, those who created the model were experts in either public or private energy 
sector subject matter, and decisions to include or not include certain domains within the C2M2s may 
have been driven by this background.72 While the ES-C2M2 and the ONG-C2M2 are sector specific, 
the C2M2 aims to assess the cybersecurity capabilities of any organization using a maturity model 
and evaluation tool. The three C2M2s are organized the same way. As shown in Table 1 and Table 
2, the C2M2 features ten domains in a logical grouping of cybersecurity practices. The ten domains 
are measured in four levels of maturity: MIL-O, MIL-1, MIL-2, and MIL-3.73 According to the C2M2 
document, the C2M2 provides a descriptive rather than a prescriptive guidance that is presented at 
a higher level of abstraction to allow for interpretation and adaptability.74 
Table 2: Ten Domains in the C2M275
Risk Management 
(RM)
Asset, Change, 
and Configura-
tion Management 
(ACM)
Identity and 
Access Manage-
ment 
(IAM)
Threat and Vul-
nerability Man-
agement (TVM)
Situational 
Awareness 
(SA)
Information 
Sharing and 
Communications 
(ISC)
Event and Inci-
dent Response, 
Continuity of 
Operations 
(IR)
Supply Chain 
and External 
Dependencies 
Management 
(EDM)
Workforce Man-
agement 
(WM)
Cybersecurity 
Program Man-
agement 
(CPM)
2. NICE Approach: NICE-CMM
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (“NICE”) 
created the NICE Capability Maturity Model or NICE-CMM and focuses on cybersecurity workforce 
planning.76 The NICE-CMM “leveraged the structure and foundational principals of” other workforce 
planning capability maturity models “to develop its own cybersecurity workforce planning capabil-
ity maturity model.”77 The NICE-CMM divides key activities into three main areas: (1) process and 
analytics, (2) integrated governance, and (3) skilled practitioners and enabling technology.78 The 
NICE-CMM ranks an organization’s cybersecurity with three levels of maturity: limited, progressing, 
or optimizing.79 The NICE-CMM focuses only on cybersecurity workforce planning, process maturity 
and operational resilience. As Miron and Muita aptly observe, the NICE-CMM does not offer specific 
cybersecurity best practices and will require additional cybersecurity frameworks to do so.80 The 
model will be most useful as a supplement to existing C2M2s or when incorporated into a C2M2 that 
needs a more robust cybersecurity workforce planning. According to Rea-Guamán et al., use of the 
Automation (PPA) Meet, New Delhi, India, 2016, https://www.woodgroup.com/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/3143/2016-04-
ISA-Delhi-power-and-petroleum.pdf (accessed October 1, 2017).
71. U.S. DoE (n 17).
72. Ibid.
73. Rea-Guamán et al. (n 22); U.S. DoE (n 17).
74. Rea-Guamán et al. (n 22).
75. See U.S. DoE (n 17).
76. NICE (n 19). 
77. Ibid. 
78. Ibid. 
79. Ibid. 
80. Miron and Muita (n 10).
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NICE-CMM will require an accurate understanding of current staffing capabilities in the three activity 
areas, and organizations undertaking such C2M2s must be able to provide specific evidence of the 
activities.81 
3. CERT Approach: CERT-RMM
Carnegie Mellon’s Software Engineering Institute (SEI) developed the Computer Emergency Response 
Team Resilience Management Model (CERT-RMM) for a broad range of organizations that aim to im-
prove operational resilience, security, and business continuity. CERT-RMM uses a resilience approach 
to help organizations manage operational risks “to critical assets by optimizing both protection and 
continuity strategies.”82 As shown in Table 1 and Table 3, CERT-RMM uses 26 domains, called practice 
areas and has three levels of maturity: Generic Goals 1 (operational resilience management system 
achieves specific goals), Generic Goals 2 (the process is institutionalized as a managed process) and 
Generic Goals 3 (the process is institutionalized as a defined process).83 
Table 3: CERT-RMM Domains
ENGINEERING OPERATIONS MANAGMENT
ADM Asset Definition and Management AM Access Management
CTRL Controls Management EC Environmental Control
RRD Resilience Requirements Development EXD External Dependencies
RRM Resilience Requirements Management ID Identity Management
RTSE Resilience Technical Solution Engineer-
ing
IMC Incident Management and Control
SC Service Continuity KIM Knowledge and Information Manage-
ment
ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT PM People Management
COMM Communications TM Technology Management
COMP Compliance VAR Vulnerability Analysis and Resolution
EF Enterprise Focus PROCESS MANAGEMENT
FRM Financial Resources Management MA Measurement and Analysis
HRM Human Resources Management MON Monitoring
OTA Organizational Training and Awareness OPD Organizational Process Definition
RISK Risk Management OPF Organizational Process Focus
4. NIST Approach: NIST Cybersecurity Framework
The U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) created 
the NIST Cybersecurity Framework to improve critical infrastructures.84 Based on globally recognized 
effective standards, guidelines, and practices, all of which is referenced in the document, the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework provides a set of cybersecurity activities designed to address the need 
for a common cybergovernance methodology.85 The NIST Cybersecurity Framework allows organiza-
tions of all sizes and sophistications to apply the principles and best practices of cybersecurity risk 
81. Rea-Guamán et al. (n 22).
82. CERT, Cyber risk and resilience management: Overview, 2017, https://www.cert.org/resilience/ (accessed October 12, 
2017).
83. Caralli (n 20). 
84. NIST (n 18).
85. Ibid. 
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management to improve the cybersecurity and resilience of critical infrastructures.86 NIST aimed 
to make the framework suitable for use outside the United States and as a model for international 
cooperation.87 However, NIST cautions that the framework is not to be used as a one-size-fits-all ap-
proach and encourages organizations to consider unique threats, vulnerabilities and risk tolerances 
when tailoring the framework to fit a specific organization’s critical cybersecurity needs, priorities, 
and financial resources.88 Notably, the NIST Framework includes a methodology to protect privacy 
and civil liberties when cybersecurity operations are conducted, and proposes a set of processes and 
activities that address privacy and civil liberties implications. The NIST Framework also encourages 
organizations to add categories and subcategories as needed based on unique organizational risks, 
and to incorporate emerging risks, threats, and vulnerabilities. The NIST Framework is voluntary and 
not legislatively required. As shown in Tables 1 and 4, the NIST Cybersecurity Framework consists of 
five framework core functions subdivided into 22 total categories.89 The framework has four tiers or 
levels of maturity: (1) partial, (2) risk informed, (3) repeatable and (4) adaptive.90
Table 4: NIST Cybersecurity Framework Core Functions and Categories
IDENTIFY Asset Management
Business Environment
Governance
Risk Assessment
Risk Management Strategy
PROTECT Access Control
Awareness and Training
Data Security
Information Protection Processes and Procedures
Maintenance
Protective Technology
DETECT Anomalies and Events
Security Continuous Monitoring
Detection Processes
RESPOND Response Planning
Communications
Analysis
Mitigation
Improvements
RECOVER Recovery Planning
Improvements
Communications
5. Other C2M2s and Related CMMs Considered
In addition to the above C2M2s, the author analyzed documents related to other C2M2s and CMMs 
that concerned cybersecurity. In the end, the author categorized these documents as supplemental 
sources that could enhance the comparison of the primary C2M2 documents. 
86. Ibid. 
87. Ibid. 
88. Ibid. 
89. Each of the categories are further divided into subcategories that are then referenced to globally accepted standards, 
guidelines, and practices.
90. Ibid. 
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Notably, the University of San Antonio’s Center for Infrastructure Assurance and Security (CIAS) de-
veloped the Community Cyber Security Maturity Model (CCSMM) to address the cybersecurity needs 
of state and local communities as in the cases of the Virginia health agency that was hacked in 200991 
and a town’s water system in Queensland, Australia in 2000.92 The CCSMM aims to create a viable and 
sustainable program tailored towards the unique needs of nations, states, communities, and organi-
zations. This model uses aspects such as cybersecurity awareness, security policies and procedures, 
inter and intra organization information sharing, and cybersecurity development through training 
and education.93 As a three-dimensional model, the CCSMM also depicts the various levels of com-
munities to include the nation, state, community, and organization.94 The CCSMM uses the following 
five levels to determine the level of capability maturity: (1) initial, (2) established, (3) self-assessed, 
(4) integrated, and (5) vanguard.95
The author also considered the Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM);96 
ISO standards97 like the ISO/IEC 15408, ISO/IEC 27001, and ISO/IEC 21827; the Information Security 
Management Maturity Model (ISM3);98 the Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology 
(COBIT); 99 Adler’s Dynamic Capability Maturity Model;100 Barclay’s Cybersecurity Capability Maturity 
Model (CM2);101 and the Holistic Cybersecurity Implementation Framework.102 However, other C2M2s 
have not gained the same level of global recognition as the four C2M2s discussed in more detail 
earlier. 
III. Document Analysis of Qatari Cybersecurity Framework
In addition to a document analysis of existing C2M2s, a document analysis of publicly available Qatari 
cybersecurity documents would benefit the paper on two points. First, it would allow for a determi-
nation of whether Qatar has adopted a C2M2 framework for cybersecurity benchmarking and process 
development purposes. Second, it would allow for a cross-comparison of the results of the document 
analysis of existing globally recognized C2M2 documents and existing Qatari cybersecurity practices, 
processes, and policies.
91. White (n 21); Rea-Guamán et al. (n 22); Jaikumar Vijayan, Web site offline as police, FBI investigate $10M
extortion bid, Computer World, May 7, 2009, www.computerworld.com/s/article/9132678/Web_site_offline_as_police_FBI_
investigate_10M_extortion_bid (accessed February 22, 2018). 
92. Todd Datz, SCADA system security: Out of control, CSO Online, August 1, 2004, www.csoonline.com/article/219486/
scada-system-security-out-of-control (accessed February 22, 2018).
93. Ibid. 
94. Ibid. Though not specifically designed for cybersecurity but rather security engineering, the SSE-CMM is worth consider-
ing because some organizations have adapted it for use in cybersecurity.
95. Ibid. 
96. Ferraiolo (n 59); Rea-Guamán et al. (n 22). Like the CCSMM, the SSE-CMM uses five levels to assess the maturity capa-
bility of an organization: (1) performed informally, (2) planned and tracked, (3) well defined, (4) quantitatively controlled, 
and (5) continuously improving.
97. Miron and Muita (n 10); Rea-Guamán et al. (n 22); NIST (n 18). While not a CMM, ISO standards provide prescriptive 
guidance for cybersecurity readiness. Unfortunately, ISO standards are complicated and costly to deploy. The NIST Frame-
work referenced many of the ISO standards including ISO/IEC 15408, ISO/IEC 27001, and ISO/IEC 21827. The ISO/IEC 15408 
is the criteria for computer security certification. ISO/IEC 27001 provides guidance and specifications for establishing an 
Information Security Management System (ISMS) in a company. It does not, however, offer a C2M2. ISO/IEC 21827 deals with 
the evaluation of software engineering processes.
98. Ibid. The Information Security Management Maturity Model (ISM3) focuses on the management of information security 
metrics and does not deal directly with cybersecurity.
99. Ibid. COBIT focuses on IT governance and does not fully address the issue of cybersecurity.
100. Adler (n 43). 
101. Corlane Barclay, Sustainable security advantage in a changing environment: The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Mod-
el (CM2), Proceedings of the 2014 ITU Kaleidoscope Academic Conference: Living in a converged world – Impossible without 
standards? (July 21, 2014).
102. Issa Atoum, Ahmed Ali Otoom & Amer Abu Ali, A holistic cyber security implementation framework, 22 Information 
Management & Computer Security 3, 251–264(14) (2014).
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The Qatar National Information Assurance Framework103 (NIAF) is the officially recognized national 
cybersecurity framework for implementing globally recognized cybersecurity standards. The NIAF 
provides a national governance roadmap for cybersecurity in Qatar. The NIAF consists of policies, 
standards, and guidelines. At the top of the NIAF is cybersecurity legislation that includes the Elec-
tronic Commerce and Electronic Signatures Law,104 the Cybercrime Law,105 the Data and Privacy 
Protection Law,106 and the Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) Law107 (still in draft 
form). Supplementing the laws are cybersecurity policies that include, among others, the Qatar Na-
tional Information Assurance Policy (NIAP),108 Qatar National Information Assurance Manual (NIAM),109 
the National Information Classification Policy (NICP),110 and the Information Security for Schools 
Policy.111 The NIAF also covers technology standards and best practices. 
Qatar also implemented a National Cybersecurity Strategy in 2014 with an action plan from 2014 to 
2018.112 However, Qatar does not currently have an officially recognized national or sector-specific 
benchmarking model to measure cybersecurity practice, process, and policy development.113 Qa-
tar’s Computer Emergency Response Team (Q-CERT), a government-sponsored organization under 
the auspices of the Ministry of Transport and Communications, which assesses the current state of 
cybersecurity efforts in Qatar, is known to have used the System Engineering Institute’s Capability 
Maturity Model Initiative (CMMI).114 However, the CMMI is not a C2M2, and Q-CERT does not seem to 
be using the CERT-RMM model. There may be incompatibility with the CMMI and the CERT-RMM in 
application.115 Therefore, a Qatari C2M2 would be an appropriate addition to the Qatar cybersecurity 
strategy and framework.
In 2014, Qatar did issue the National Information Assurance Policy (NIAP), which consists of the Na-
103. Q-CERT, Qatar National Information Assurance Framework 2014, available in English, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/
events/2008/brisbane/docs/lewis-qatar-national-strategy-brisbane-july-08.pdf (accessed February 22, 2018).
104. Qatar Decree Law No (16) of 2010 on the Promulgation of the Electronic Commerce and Transactions Law, available in 
English at Al Meezan http://www.almeezan.qa/LawPage.aspx?id=2678&language=en (accessed February 22, 2018).
105. Qatar Cybercrime Law, Decree Law No (14) of 2014, available in pdf (Arabic) at International Labour Organization (ILO) 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=100242 (accessed February 22, 2018).
106. Qatar Data and Privacy Protection Law, Decree Law No (13) of 2016, available in pdf (English) at Sultan Al-Abdullah 
and Partners https://qatarlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Personal-Data-Privacy-Law-No.-13-of-2016.pdf (accessed 
February 22, 2018).
107. Qatar Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Law (CIIP) (not yet published). The law awaits signature by the 
emir as of the writing of this paper. 
108. Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, National Information Assurance Policy, 2014, http://www.
qcert.org/library/36 (accessed October 17, 2017) (“NIAP”).
109. Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, National Information Assurance Manual, 2014, http://www.
qcert.org/library/36 (accessed October 17, 2017) (“NIAM”).
110. Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, National Information Classification Policy, 2014, http://www.
qcert.org/library/36 (accessed October 17, 2017) (“NICP”).
111. Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, Information Security Framework for School Networks, 2014, 
http://www.qcert.org/library/36 (accessed October 17, 2017).
112. QNCS (n 16). 
113. International Telecommunications Union, Cyberwellness profile: Qatar, in Global Cybersecurity Index & Cyberwell-
ness Profiles: Report, 382, ABI Research, 2015, https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-SECU-2015-PDF-E.pdf 
(accessed October 17, 2017); ITU, ‘Cyberwellness Profile: Qatar’ (2014) http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Docu-
ments/Country_Profiles/Qatar.pdf (accessed October 17, 2017).
114. Noora Fetais, director of KINDI Computer Research Center, Qatar University, email correspondence (October 19, 2017) 
(copy on file with the author); Q-CERT, About Q-CERT, 2017, http://www.qcert.org/about-q-cert.
 (accessed October 18, 2017).
115. Matthew J. Butkovic & Richard A. Caralli, Advancing cybersecurity capability measurement
using the CERT®-RMM maturity indicator level scale, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University Research 
Showcase, 2013, http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1766&context=sei (accessed October 18, 2017) 
(stating that “[w]hile the CMMI maturity levels and descriptions are a good fit for CERT-RMM, in practice the spacing be-
tween levels often causes CERT-RMM practitioners some difficulty.”).
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tional Information Classification Policy (NICP)116 and the National Information Assurance Manual (NIA-
M).117 NICP provides a high-level information classification methodology for Qatari state entities that 
allows for the determination of corresponding values, risks, and protection a state entity must apply 
to information.118 NIAM, supplemented by the Guidance for Assurance Manual (GFAM),119 provides a 
baseline for controls that an organization should implement at minimum to protect its information 
system.120 NIAM is designed to be used in conjunction with the NICP and the applicable laws and reg-
ulations within the State of Qatar.121 NIAM only applies to government agencies and corresponding 
assets with an NICP classification higher than I0, A0, and C0.122 Like C2M2s, NIAM categorizes cyber-
security practices and processes into 26 domains.123 
NIAM, however, does not include a method to measure the maturity of Qatar’s cybersecurity process, 
practices, and policies. In short, NIAM is not a C2M2. However, that NIAM sets outs the policy objec-
tives and baseline controls of 26 domains covering cybersecurity practices, processes, and policies 
applicable to Qatari state agencies makes it an ideal starting point for a comparison with existing 
C2M2s and towards a Qatari C2M2. 
IV. Comparative Analysis of Existing Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Models in Light of the Qa-
tari Cybersecurity Framework
A. Comparative Analysis of C2M2s in the Literature
A number of researchers, whether to propose a C2M2 as in the case of Miron and Muita124 or to con-
duct a comparative study as in the case of Rea-Guamán et al.,125 have compared existing C2M2 mod-
els. According to Miron and Muita, analysis and comparison of existing C2M2s can “provide the stages 
for an evolutionary path to developing policies and processes” for cybersecurity benchmarking, 
measurement, and development.126 While recognizing the robustness of the NIST Framework, Miron 
and Muita also criticized it for relying on operators “to voluntarily develop individual profiles.”127 
Additionally, they criticized existing C2M2s for their lack of specificity in providing only high-level 
advice, and for being designed by and for specific industries.128 Furthermore, while they provide 
specific standards for cybersecurity readiness, the ISO standards, according to Miron and Muita, are 
complex, expensive, and time consuming to implement.129 For these reasons, Miron and Muita pro-
posed a C2M2 specifically for municipal critical infrastructure.130
Rea-Guamán et al. conducted a taxonomical comparative analysis of C2M2s that they considered the 
116. NIAP (n 143). 
117. Ministry of Information and Communications Technology and Q-CERT, National Information Assurance Manual [2014] 
http://www.qcert.org/sites/default/files/public/documents/nia_policy__manual_english_v2.0_0.pdf  (accessed December 
12, 2018) (“NIAM”).
118. NICP (n 129).
119. Qatar Ministry of Transport and Communications, ‘Guidance for Assurance Manual v.2.0’ (2014) http://www.motc.gov.
qa/sites/default/files/guidance_nia_manual-v2.0_english_1.pdf (accessed 17 October 2017. 
120. NIAM (n 135). 
121. Ibid. 
122. Ibid. 
123. Ibid. See Table 5 for a list of NIAM domains. 
124. Miron and Muita (n 10).
125. Rea-Guamán et al. (n 22).
126. Miron and Muita (n 10).
127. Ibid. 
128. Ibid. 
129. Ibid. 
130. Ibid. 
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most widely mentioned in academic journals: C2M2, SSE-CMM, CCSMM, and NICE.131 Rea-Guamán et 
al. largely agree with Miron and Muita’s analysis that existing C2M2s require customization, some re-
quiring dual implementation with the NIST Framework. For Rea-Guamán et al., the only C2M2 model 
designed specifically for cybersecurity is the C2M2.132 Rea-Guamán et al. also recognized the SSE-
CMM as the only one along with the U.S. DoE’s C2M2 that specifically focuses on risk management, 
even though all C2M2s are based on cybersecurity risk management.133 The SSE-CMM, however, is not 
designed specifically for cybersecurity but rather for security engineering processes.134
Researchers agree that implementation and management of existing C2M2s requires a specialized 
skill set and is a complicated, expensive, and time-consuming endeavor.135 Even with the choices 
among the existing C2M2s, an organization needs to refine and tailor the C2M2 and the organization’s 
processes to implement the chosen C2M2.136 For this reason, the author proposes that designing a 
C2M2 for Qatar around already existing processes in the NIAP would minimize these concerns. A pro-
posed Q-C2M2 that already takes into account the existing domains and practices in the NIAP would 
make it less complicated and less expensive to adopt. Such a Q-C2M2 would also save time, as it 
would make use of existing personnel with specialized skill sets already available in Qatar.137 
B. Thematic Analysis of C2M2s and the Qatar Cybersecurity Framework
Having discussed the literature and compared the C2M2s, the paper can now build on previous 
taxonomical or generalized comparative analysis by analyzing the thematic elements of existing 
C2M2s and Qatar’s cybersecurity framework. Table 5 compares C2M2 domains and adds Qatar’s NIAP 
domains listed under NIAM. 
Table 5: Comparison of Domains of Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Models
The most striking thematic organization of existing C2M2s is the NIST Framework, which organizes 
the framework into the five core functions of cybersecurity: identify, detect, protect, respond, and 
recover.138 After the coding and analysis of the core functions of the NIST Framework, the thematic 
analysis revealed that the five words repeat thematically in the NIST Framework, the U.S. DoE’s 
C2M2, and the CERT-RMM. These words do not exist thematically in the NICE-CMM. In Qatar’s NIAP 
and National Cybersecurity Strategy, the five words appear thematically.139 However, there is one 
glaring observation: the word “respond” only appears once in the NIAP and is not a thematic ele-
ment. Additionally, the theme “critical infrastructure” is prevalent in the NIST Framework and the 
U.S. DoE’s C2M2, but the term does not appear in the CERT-RMM and the NICE-CMM. In the Qatari 
cybersecurity framework, critical infrastructure is an important element and falls under the Qatar 
NIAF, for which Qatar is in the draft stages of the CIIP Law. The Qatar cybersecurity framework refers 
to critical infrastructure as “critical information infrastructure.” Critical infrastructure or critical 
information infrastructure appear in the Qatar National Cybersecurity Strategy, the NIAF, and the 
NIAP. Interestingly, in the NIAP neither critical infrastructure nor critical information infrastructure 
appears as a thematic element, but only as a reference to the CIIP Law.
131. Rea-Guamán et al. (n 22).
132. Ibid. 
133. Ibid. 
134. Rea-Guamán et al. (n 22).
135. Rea-Guamán et al. (n 22); Miron and Muita (n 10).
136. Ibid. 
137. The Q-C2M2 proposed in Section VI addresses these concerns, as discussed in more detail in relation to the diffusion of 
innovation theory. See infra Section VI(A).
138. NIST (n 18). 
139. See generally NIAP (n 143); QNCS (n 16).
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“Risk management” appears as a thematic element in the NIST Framework, the U.S. DoE’s C2M2, 
and the CERT-RMM, but does not appear in the NICE-CMM. Risk management also appears in the 
Qatar National Cybersecurity Strategy and the NIAP. “Data security” is a thematic element in the 
NIST Framework and the CERT-RMM, but is not in the U.S. DoE’s C2M2 nor in the NICE-CMM. The NIST 
Framework defines data security as “information and records (data) managed consistent with the 
organization’s risk strategy to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information.”140 
In the Qatar cybersecurity framework, data security is not a thematic element and does not appear 
in the documents. This is interesting because “security” is a thematic element in the NIAP, which 
covers 12 of the 26 domains on different types of security practices but does not cover data security 
specifically.141 Instead, the NIAP deals with data security implicitly in separated and ad-hoc practices 
such as logging and classification. 
“Asset” is a thematic element in the NIST Framework, the U.S. DoE’s C2M2, and the CERT-RMM, but 
does not appear in the NICE-CMM. Asset is also a thematic element in the Qatar cybersecurity frame-
work, including in the NIAP and in the Qatar National Cybersecurity Strategy. However, while the 
NIAP recognizes asset as a thematic element and thus includes a classification policy for information 
assets, the NIAP lacks an asset management plan similar to those in the NIST Framework, the U.S. 
DoE’s C2M2, and the CERT-RMM. Additionally, “governance” and “training” are thematic elements 
that appear in all the C2M2s and the Qatar cybersecurity framework, including the NIAP and the 
Qatar National Cybersecurity Strategy.
Table 7: Sample Thematic Analysis of C2M2 Documents and Qatar’s Cybersecurity Framework 
Documents
Themes
Analyzed
U.S. C2M2s NICE-CMM CERT-RMM NIST Frame-
work
Qatar Nation-
 al Cybersecurity
Strategy
NIAP
 identify YES NO YES YES YES YES
detect YES NO YES YES YES YES
protect YES NO YES YES YES YES
respond YES NO YES YES YES YES
recover YES NO YES YES NO NO
critical infra-
structure
YES NO NO YES YES NO
risk manage-
ment
YES NO YES YES YES YES
data security NO NO YES YES NO NO
asset YES NO YES YES YES YES
governance YES YES YES YES YES YES
training YES YES YES YES YES YES
C. Lessons Learned from the Comparative Analysis 
The thematic and comparative analysis of the documents reveals important lessons about both the 
existing C2M2s and Qatar’s cybersecurity framework.
.(NIST (n 18 .140
 NIAP uses the word “security” for the following domains: Access Control Security, Cryptographic Security, Gateway .141
 Security, Media Security, Network Security, Personnel Security, Physical Security, Portable Device and Work Off-Site Security,
.Product Security, Software Security, System Usage Security, and Third Party Security
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That “respond” is not a thematic element in the NIAP signals that the respond core function of the 
NIAP may need improvement. A Q-C2M2 that uses the NIST Framework’s core functions would benefit 
the benchmarking and development of Qatar’s cybersecurity framework.
Concerning critical infrastructure, that Qatar uses the terminology “critical information infrastruc-
ture” may signal Qatar’s potential for a limited definition of “critical infrastructure” in the CIIP Law 
or a similar approach as the CCSMM’s “critical cyber infrastructure.” As mentioned in the introduc-
tion, however, it is important to recognize the interdependent nature of cybersecurity, and that 
critical infrastructures could include cyber interdependent sectors like food, transportation, infor-
mation and communication technologies, energy and utilities, financial systems, health, and govern-
ment.142 Notably, that the NIAP only gives passing reference to the theme “critical infrastructure” or 
“critical information infrastructure” means that the NIAP will need improvements to cover critical 
information infrastructure, especially to meet the requirement of the CIIP Law once it is enacted. 
When comparing NIAP with existing C2M2s, it becomes clear that NIAP lacks certain domains and 
activities deemed essential according to globally recognized standards and practices. One reason 
may be that NIAP is not a C2M2 but rather a policy for enhancing the security of information.143 Nev-
ertheless, the comparative analysis identified areas for improving NIAP. The comparative analysis 
revealed, among other discoveries, the importance of adding compliance, protective technology, 
awareness and training, mitigation, improvement, and communication in a C2M2 designed for Qatar, 
as shown in Table 8. 
One of the most important aims is to add more explicit domains and activities relating to organiza-
tional response to a cybersecurity incident. The NIST Framework’s mitigation and communication 
domains would bolster NIAP and make it more resilient. NIAP’s governance domain also lacks focus 
on legal and regulatory compliance, and financial planning. NIAP also lacks domains relating to main-
tenance and improvement, which are present in the NIST Framework and the CERT-RMM. 
Table 8: Sample Comparison of C2M2 with Qatar’s NIAP
 NIST Core
Functions
U.S. C2M2s NICE-CMM CERT-RMM NIST Frame-
w o r k
NIAP
Identify NONE NONE Compliance NONE NONE
Identify NONE NONE Financial Re-
source Manage-
ment
NONE NONE
Identify NONE NONE  Measurement
and Analysis
NONE NONE
Protect Threat and Vulnera-
bility Management
NONE  Vulnerabi l i ty
 Analysis and
Reso lu t i on
NONE NONE
Protect Threat and Vulnera-
bility Management
NONE Controls Man-
agement
Maintenance NONE
142. Miron and Muita (n 10).
143. NIAP (n 143); NIAM (n 135). NIAM states that it “provides, baseline controls which an organization should implement at 
minimum to protect their information system.”
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Protect Threat and Vulnera-
bility Management
NONE Resilience Re-
quirements De-
velopment
 P r o t e c t i v e
Te c h n o l o g y
NONE
Protect Workforce Manage-
ment
 Process and
Analyt ics
Human Re-
source Manage-
m e n t
 Awareness and
Training
NONE
Protect Workforce Manage-
ment
Trained pro-
 fessionals and
enabling tech-
nology
People Manage-
ment
 Awareness and
Training
NONE
Respond  Event and Incident
 Response, Continuity
of Operations
NONE Incident Man-
 agement and
Control
Analysis NONE
Respond  Event and Incident
 Response, Continuity
of Operations
NONE NONE  Mitigation NONE
 Recover  Information Sharing
and Communications
NONE C o m m u n i c a -
t i o n s
C o m m u n i c a -
t i o n s
NONE
V. Qatar Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (Q-C2M2)
As stated above, this paper conducted a document analysis of the most prominent and proven 
C2M2s, and compared the domains of those C2M2s to Qatar’s cybersecurity framework, by taking into 
account Qatar’s NIAM. One of the paper’s main aims is to propose a Qatar C2M2 or Q-C2M2 with a 
legislative framework. This section examines the potential contribution of the Q-C2M2 to the Qatari 
cybersecurity framework, and discusses the likelihood of adoption by applying the diffusion of inno-
vation theory. The section concludes with a discussion of the domains and measures of the Q-C2M2. 
It should be noted that this paper does not propose a predetermined set of activities for each of 
the domains. Rather, the paper provides a workable framework of domains and subdomains based 
on existing C2M2s with the hope that potential adopters of the Q-C2M2, when establishing an ini-
tial benchmark, would look through the activities in existing C2M2s and reconcile those activities 
with the adopting organization’s existing cybersecurity activities, profile, and risk tolerance. As in 
capacity building, the implementation method will differ for each organization, and as such, “the 
participation of senior decision makers across all areas of the company is critical.”144 Likewise, the 
building of the Q-C2M2 should take a comprehensive approach that includes the participation of 
decision makers, and is tailored to the organization’s existing cybersecurity program. 
Borrowing from a feature of the CCSMM, the Q-C2M2 is designed for applicability across dimensions 
within the Qatari context, and this section discusses Q-C2M2’s applicability in public, private, and 
personal dimensions. The section then proposes a legislative framework for the implementation of 
Q-C2M2. 
A. Contribution of Q-C2M2 and the Diffusion of Innovation Theory
Utility and validity will largely determine whether an organization will accept a proposed CMM.145 It 
is important that a proposed CMM will be useful and valid for an organization. In the context of a 
Q-C2M2, usefulness will depend on the proposed model’s compatibility with existing frameworks and 
144. Adam Palmer, A model framework for successful cybersecurity capacity building, J of Internet L 15 (2016). 
145. Lahrmaan et al. (n 23).
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policy, such as Qatar’s National Information Assurance Policy (NIA Policy). Validity will depend on the 
proposed C2M2’s basis for determining the domains and measures of capability, mainly whether it is 
based on existing and proven C2M2s and whether the creation of the C2M2 took into account Qatar’s 
existing frameworks and policies.
In determining what will prompt organizations, especially state entities, to adopt a C2M2, Miron and 
Muita referred to the diffusion of innovation theory.146 The theory identifies five factors that affect 
the decision to adopt a C2M2: (1) relative advantage, (2) compatibility, (3) simplicity, (4) trialabil-
ity and (5) observability.147 Relative advantage refers to the value that the proposed technology or 
innovation will contribute to the current existing processes or practices.148 The proposed Q-C2M2, 
therefore, should add value to the Qatar NIAP and the NIAF. In this regard, the Q-C2M2 adds value 
by having identified domains or practice areas where the Qatar NIAP does not cover, and which the 
Q-C2M2 would enhance, including to improve cybersecurity protection with protection technology 
and resilience management, and to improve cybersecurity response with mitigation and improve-
ment management.
Compatibility refers to the ease with which Qatari state entities and non-state organizations can 
incorporate the proposed Q-C2M2 into their current processes, practices, and policies.149 As this 
paper’s comparative and document analysis included Qatari cybersecurity documents, the proposed 
Q-C2M2 takes into account existing Qatar cybersecurity processes, practices, and policies. There-
fore, the proposed Q-C2M2 will likely have a high level of compatibility. 
Simplicity refers to the user friendliness of the innovation, whether users find it difficult to use. 
Indeed, as noted by a number of researchers, complexity has been a hallmark of C2M2s.150 The pro-
posed Q-C2M2 aims to simplify by grouping practices and processes into themes the way the NIST 
Framework’s core functions does, and by measuring the capability maturity of the core functions. 
By working at the thematic level, the Q-C2M2 will help simplify and streamline the Qatar NIAM. Tri-
alability refers to the user’s ability to try the innovation without commitment.151 As the Q-C2M2 is 
not a commercial venture, Qatari state entities and non-state organizations could assess and try the 
Q-C2M2 without commitment. If the Q-C2M2 becomes incorporated into Qatar’s NIAF as a legislative 
requirement or policy, the author suggests that a trial and training period be implemented.
Finally, observability refers to the visibility of the innovation in a community of the adopter’s peers.152 
When applied to cybersecurity, the question could be translated into whether other state and non-
state organizations have used a C2M2. While other organizations may not have used the Q-C2M2, 
as they would have tailored a C2M2 for their unique organization needs, the use of C2M2s in the 
cybersecurity field has been widespread.153 Leading state agencies in the United States and the 
United Kingdom do use a C2M2. The use of C2M2s would be readily observable among peers in the 
cybersecurity community. 
B. Q-C2M2 Domains and Subdomains
146. Miron and Muita (n 10); Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (Free Press, 1983).
147. See generally Rogers (n 162). 
148. Ibid.
149. Ibid. 
150. Ibid. 
151. Ibid. 
152. Ibid. 
153. Miron and Muita (n 10). 
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The proposed Q-C2M2 adopts the NIST Framework’s approach of using five core functions as the main 
domains of the model.154 The five core functions are applicable in the Qatari context because they 
are common across critical infrastructure sectors, an important element in the Qatari cybersecurity 
framework, and they remain important thematic elements in existing C2M2s. Additionally, the five 
core functions can be a means to simplify the organization and process of the Q-C2M2. Even if the 
five core functions are not common in non-critical infrastructures, they remain important thematic 
concepts even in non-critical infrastructure C2M2s like the CERT-RMM and the CCSMM, both of which 
do not focus on critical infrastructure but maintain the five core functions as key thematic elements.
The Q-C2M2, however, renames the core functions into the following domains: Understand Secure, 
Expose, Respond, and Sustain. Renaming the core functions into the domains achieves preciseness 
and clarity, and can now be easier to remember as USERS. These five domains are compatible with 
the control types classification of the NIAP, which are deter, avoid, prevent, detect, react, and 
recover.155 In comparison to the NIST Framework’s core functions, Understand is more precise than 
NIST’s Identify because the organization must understand what and how to control cybersecurity 
risks to assets, data, personnel, systems, and processes. Secure is more appropriate than Protect in 
the Qatari context because of the NIAP’s focus on security, security being a persistent and observ-
able thematic element in the NIAP. Expose is more appropriate than Detect because it implies the 
need to uncover the perpetrators or the source of an event, and covers a cybersecurity program’s 
exposure to risks. Detecting an event without a policy towards discovering the source is reactive 
rather than proactive and may result in repeated future events. Respond seems the most appropri-
ate term concerning an organization’s action after an event or incident is exposed. Sustain is more 
precise than NIST’s Recover because it embraces the concept of resilience and continuity at a certain 
level. Table 9 below illustrates the domains and subdomains under the Q-C2M2.
Table 9: Q-C2M2 Domains and Subdomains
DOMAINS SUBDOMAINS
 Understand  Cybergovernance
Assets
Risks
Training
 Secure  Data Security
Technology Security
Access Control Security
Communications Security
Personnel Security
 Expose  Monitoring
Incident Management
Detection
 Respond Analysis
Exposure
 Sustain Recovery Planning
Continuity Management
Improvement
External Dependencies
154. For an explanation of the NIST Framework’s five core functions, see NIST (n 18) 8 and App A. 
155. Q-CERT, National Information Assurance Policy Ver 2.0 Control Types, http://www.qcert.org/sites/default/files/public/
documents/cs-csps_controls_classification_v1.1.pdf (accessed Dcember 17, 2018). 
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1. Understand Domain
The Understand domain includes four subdomains: Cybergovernance, Assets, Risks, and Training. 
These four subdomains are consistent with the existing C2M2, primarily the NIST Framework, the 
U.S. DoE’s C2M2, and the CERT-RMM, all of which include governance, asset management, risk man-
agement, and training as categories. The NICE-CMM only includes governance. The Q-C2M2’s Cyber-
governance domain includes the Governance and Business Environment categories under the NIST 
Framework and the Compliance and Financial Resource Management of the CERT-RMM, and combines 
these activities with the Governance, Documentation, and Change Management domains under the 
NIAP. Essentially, the Cybergovernance domain enhances the NIAP’s approach by adding management 
of regulatory, legal, financial, and strategic organizational needs.156 Under the Q-C2M2, NIAP’s Data 
Labelling, as required under the NICP, and Data Retention and Archival would fall under the Assets 
subdomain, which includes the management of data, personnel, technology, systems, and facilities. 
The Q-C2M2 would improve on the NIAP’s focus on information asset classification by managing other 
types of assets. The Risk domain includes risk assessment, risk management, and risk strategy, com-
bined with the NIAP’s approach of best practices among the C2M2s. One significant difference in the 
Q-C2M2 as compared to the NIST Framework is that Training now falls under the Understand domain 
as training enhances an organization’s understanding of cybersecurity risks. The NIST Framework’s 
inclusion of Awareness and Training is confusing when reconciled with the definition of Identify, 
which aims to develop organizational understanding and awareness of cybersecurity risks. 
2. Secure Domain 
The Secure domain follows the NIAP approach and adopts a similar approach to the Security Controls 
and Security Processes under NIAP. Subdomains under the Secure domain include Data Security, Tech-
nology Security, Access Control Security, Communications Security, and Personnel Security. The pro-
posed Q-C2M2, however, adds Data Security as a subdomain, consistent with Qatar’s Data and Privacy 
Protection Law. The proposed Q-C2M2 also adds Technology Security, which consolidates a number of 
technology-related security controls under NIAP including Cryptographic Security, Software Security, 
Network Security, Gateway Security, Product Security, Media Security, Portable Device and Off-Site 
Security, and Virtualization. Another subdomain under the Secure domain is Access Control Security, 
which encompasses System Usage Security, Identity and Logging Security, and Physical Access Securi-
ty. Another subdomain is Communications Security, which has Information Exchange Security among 
its activities. The proposed Q-C2M2 adopts from the NIAP as a subdomain Personnel Security, which 
deals with the human element. 
3. Expose Domain
The Expose domain includes the subdomains of Monitoring, Incident Management, Detection, Analy-
sis, and Exposure. The Expose domain combines the Incident Management domain of NIAP with the 
Monitoring domain of the NIST Framework and the CERT-RMM, and the Detection Processes domain 
of the NIST Framework. The Expose domain also includes an Analysis subdomain, borrowed from the 
U.S. DoE’s C2M2, and an Expose subdomain, which aims to track and uncover sources of incidents. 
Identifying perpetrators, however, has been identified as one of the key challenges to cybersecurity. 
As stated by Palmer, “[m]oving from monitoring and investigating advanced electronic evidence to 
the identification, disruption, and apprehension of the perpetrator(s) can represent a significant 
156. According to Palmer, “Cybersecurity is not just a technical solution. The foundation for all technical solutions should 
be based on a clear understanding of policy requirements and strategy goals.” Palmer (n 160) 15.
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challenge.”157 The Expose subdomain, for example, requires an organization to seek assistance from 
private sector service providers, and may also require the investigation and monitoring of criminal 
networks.158 
4. Respond Domain
The Respond domain borrows heavily from the NIST Framework and includes Response Planning, 
Mitigation, and Response Communication. The proposed Q-C2M2 improves Qatar’s NIAP by borrowing 
from the NIST Framework, especially in terms of Mitigation and Improvement. Qatar’s NIAP currently 
groups response activities under the Incident Management domain and, in so doing, bypasses import-
ant activities such as mitigation and improvement of incident response. The Response Communica-
tion subdomain borrows from both the NIST Framework and the U.S. DoE’s C2M2 in that it aims to 
ensure proper response communication with internal and external stakeholders. 
5. Sustain Domain
The Sustain domain reorients the NIST Framework’s core concept of Recover to emphasize that recov-
ery must embrace maintaining and managing a certain level of sustainability long term. The Sustain 
domain includes Recovery Planning, Continuity Management, Improvement, and External Depen-
dencies. The Continuity Management subdomain adopts the NIAP’s Business Continuity Management 
domain. However, Recovery Planning, which addresses the immediate recovery from an incident, is 
separated under the Q-C2M2. The Improvement subdomain, borrowed from the NIST Framework, is 
another important addition to ensure that sustainability includes the process of learning from past 
incidents. Finally, the External Dependencies subdomain, borrowed from the U.S. DoE’s C2M2 and 
the CERT-RMM, is combined with the NIAP’s Third Party Security Management domain.159 
D. Q-C2M2 Measures
One main difference versus the NIST Framework is that the Q-C2M2 will measure the capability 
maturity of a state entity or non-state organization at the core function level. The NIST Framework 
measures capability maturity in a rather general sense and does not rely on the tier measurement 
but rather on a review of the overall profile to determine maturity. In this regard, NIST has been 
criticized for not providing a specific measure of capability maturity. The Q-C2M2 adopts the concept 
behind the core functions of the NIST Framework but improves it by measuring capability maturity 
at the core function stage. 
The Q-C2M2 will measure a state entity or a non-state organization’s level of Understanding, Securi-
ty, Exposure, Responsiveness, and Sustainability. These measures are easier to comprehend as mea-
surements than the NIST Framework’s core functions. The measures will identify an organization’s 
maturity in terms of the following levels: Initiating, Implementing, Developing, Adaptive, and Agile. 
These levels are a combination and an improvement from existing C2M2s because of the document 
and comparative analysis conducted in this paper.
In the Initiating stage, an organization is only employing ad-hoc cybersecurity practices and pro-
cess under some of the domains. In the Implementing stage, an organization has adopted policies 
to implement all of the cybersecurity activities under the domains with the aim of completing im-
157. Palmer (n 160) 16.
158. Ibid.
 Palmer also identifies internal/external cooperation as necessary for cybersecurity capacity building and development. .159
.Palmer (n 160) 17
51رطق ةعماج رش�ن راد ،راش�لحاب س�الخا عبارلا ددعلا ،2018 دلجلما ،نوناقلل ةيلودلا ةلجلما
plementation at a certain time. In the Developing stage, an organization has implemented policies 
and practices to develop and improve cybersecurity activities under the domains with the aim of 
suggesting new activities to implement. In the Adaptive stage, adopted from the NIST Framework, 
an organization revisits and reviews cybersecurity activities and adopts practices based on a predic-
tive indicators derived from previous experiences and measures. In the Agile stage, an organization 
continues to practice the Adaptive stage but with an added emphasis on agility and speed in imple-
menting activities in the domains. 
Figure 2: Q-C2M2 Maturity Levels
E. Q-C2M2 Dimensions 
The proposed Q-C2M2 borrows from the CCSMM’s focus on the third dimension posed by cybersecu-
rity risks to communities at the national, state, community and organization levels. When adopt-
ed by Qatar, the dimensions will include national, municipal, community, and organization levels. 
Adopting these community dimensions is a recognition that cybersecurity is interdependent and that 
cybersecurity protection of government entities alone could lead to vulnerabilities. For example, 
false news hacked into community or organization levels could impact national cybersecurity. The 
Q-C2M2, therefore, also measures the capability maturity of cybersecurity programs at the munici-
pal, community, and organization levels. Businesses, ranging from small and medium enterprises to 
large enterprises, would fall under the organization level. 
VI. Legislative Framework
This section discusses the legislative and regulatory aspects of the Q-C2M2. First, the section discuss-
es and argues for a legislatively mandated Q-C2M2 to make it a more effective improvement to Qa-
tar’s NIAF. Second, the section discusses the issue of adopting the Q-C2M2 and incorporating it within 
Qatar’s existing cybersecurity framework’s legislations, policies, and standards. Third, the section 
discusses the important role of the Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Law, which is ex-
pected to be signed into law soon. Finally, the section elaborates on the legal framework embedded 
within the Q-C2M2 design itself, with particular emphasis on legal and regulatory compliance, an 
obviously lacking domain under the existing NIAM. 
A. Legislatively Mandated Q-C2M2
One of the prevailing criticisms of existing C2M2s is its voluntary nature. According to Miron and Mui-
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ta, C2M2s cannot be “fostered effectively in an unlegislated environment.”160 The C2M2s analyzed in 
this paper, for example, are all voluntary. Even for providers of critical infrastructures in the United 
States, C2M2s are not mandatory.161 To make the proposed Q-C2M2 more effective, the author advo-
cates for a legislatively mandated Q-C2M2 with tiered levels of mandatory capability and voluntary 
capability. 
For example, Qatar should mandate all public entities and private entities, in sectors considered part 
of critical infrastructure (food, finance, transportation, media, energy, and communications), to at-
tain the highest level of maturity across all domains within specified deadlines. The Q-C2M2 proposes 
that the level of legislatively mandated capability maturity for critical infrastructures should be 
Agile maturity. Other private organizations in non-critical infrastructures should meet a lower level 
of mandated maturity, but may voluntarily achieve the highest level of maturity across all domains. 
The level of capability maturity for non-critical infrastructures entities under the Q-C2M2 should be, 
at minimum, a Developing maturity. UAE’s NESA is an example of a similar approach with mandatory 
and voluntary aspects in the maturity capability assessment. 162 NESA’s reporting procedures require 
a maturity-based self-assessment by stakeholders to be consistent with NESA’s mandatory versus vol-
untary requirements.163 Only a mandatory system would achieve the aims of the C2M2 and ensure a 
stronger cybersecurity environment. As the adage goes, a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. 
One predictable criticism of a mandated approach is the cost that such a system would pose on busi-
nesses. A cost–benefit analysis supports a mandated system. However, as the cost of implementing 
a mandated cybersecurity capability maturity would be lower in a small country such as Qatar, the 
benefits of lower cyberattacks and cybercrimes outweigh the costs. In Qatar’s case, the hacking of 
QNA, which led to the economic blockade, makes for an even stronger argument in favor of national 
security, as a weak cybersecurity environment lacking such a mandate would lead to higher risks 
and costs for businesses. Mandating the Q-C2M2 for national and public security interests would be 
consistent with Qatar’s cybersecurity strategy.164
B. Adopting the Q-C2M2
Adopting a C2M2 would not necessarily be a novel approach in the region, but it would bring Qatar 
in line with leading practices. Oman, the only country in the Gulf Region to achieve a “leading” 
status in the ITU Global Cybersecurity Index of 2017,165 adopted, through its Information Technology 
Authority, a Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Assessment back in 2015.166 Countries adopting a ca-
160. Miron and Muita (n 10).
161. See U.S. DoE (n 17); U.S. DoE ONG-C2M2 (n 66); U.S. DoE ES-C2M2 (n 64). See also Miron and Muita (n 10).
162. Downton (supra n 161).
163. Ibid.
164. QNCS (n 16). It states that “Qatar’s vision is to establish and maintain a secure cyberspace to safeguard national inter-
ests…” 
165. International Telecommunications Union, Global Cybersecurity Index 2017, 2017, https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/
opb/str/D-STR-GCI.01-2017-PDF-E.pdf (accessed February 23, 2018). Oman ranked fourth, while Qatar, classified as “matur-
ing,” ranked twenty-fifth globally.
166. Sultanate of Oman, Information Technology Authority, Annual report 2015, available in (English) pdf at https://www.
ita.gov.om/ITAPortal/MediaCenter/Document_detail.aspx?NID=115 (accessed December 17, 2018). In 2015, the UAE’s Na-
tional Electronic Security Authority (NESA), charged with protecting the UAE’s critical information infrastructure and cyber 
security, also adopted a maturity-based assessment like a C2M2 and was inspired by the NIST Framework. Ben Downton, 
NESA – the new standard of information security in the UAE, MWR Security, April 6, 2015, https://www.mwrinfosecurity.
com/our-thinking/nesa-the-new-standard-of-information-security-in-the-uae/ (accessed February 23, 2018). The Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), also uses a cybersecurity framework with maturity levels like the C2M2, adopting an ap-
proach similar to the NIST Framework. Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority (SAMA), Cyber security framework v. 1 (May 2017), 
available in (English) pdf at http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/Laws/BankingRules/SAMA%20Cyber%20Security%20Framework.
pdf (accessed February 23, 2018). Kuwait and Bahrain have not adopted a C2M2-like approach in their cybersecurity frame-
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pability maturity assessment approach in their cybersecurity framework have not faced difficulty in 
making the adoption, but the execution of such approaches has certainly increased these countries’ 
ability to improve cybersecurity, as seen in the case of Oman.167 
Additionally, adoption and implementation of a C2M2 in Qatar could be achieved without further 
need for new legislation. Adopting the Q-C2M2 would certainly fall under the mandate of the Qa-
tar Cybersecurity Strategy and the National Information Assurance Framework. The Q-C2M2 would 
be incorporated into the NIAF and would fall within the scope of existing policies, standards, and 
legislation. The NIAF’s tiered approach to cybersecurity, as discussed in Section IV above, could 
accommodate the incorporation of the Q-C2M2. First, the Q-C2M2 could be an addition to existing 
policies or standards under the NIAF. Second, the Q-C2M2 could also be added as an amendment to 
existing legislation to ensure compliance with both the Q-C2M2 and the existing cybersecurity leg-
islations such as the Data and Privacy Protection Law. Interestingly, the Data and Privacy Protection 
Law already includes an audit compliance mechanism.168 A Q-C2M2 compliance could perhaps be 
added to such an audit compliance as well, and it could also be added through a committee process 
in one of the pending legislations, most appropriately the forthcoming CIIP Law. Alternatively, the 
Q-C2M2 could be incorporated into existing policies and standards such as the NIAM under the NIAP, 
or as a third extension in the NIAP, which would then include the NICP, NIAM, and Q-C2M2. Again, 
the NIAP already includes an audit compliance mechanism for state agencies, relating the NICP for 
auditing asset identification and classification.169 The Q-C2M2 could also be incorporated into that 
mechanism. Unfortunately, the audit requirement under the NIAP only applied to state agencies.170 
C. Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Law
For critical infrastructures, it remains to be seen whether the forthcoming CIIP Law will include a 
benchmarking and process improvement framework like the proposed Q-C2M2. The need for such a 
process for benchmarking and measuring the development of cybersecurity for critical infrastruc-
tures is even more striking for the financial, food, and media sectors. These three sectors were 
greatly affected by the cybersecurity vulnerabilities exposed by the blockade on Qatar. It remains 
to be seen whether the CIIP Law will define critical infrastructure sectors broadly or with a limited 
scope. According to Q-CERT, “sectors are deemed critical when their incapacitation or destruc-
tion would have a debilitating impact on the national security and social well-being of a nation.”171 
Q-CERT also aims to identify critical infrastructure interdependencies by creating a critical infor-
mation infrastructure protection interdependency database.172 The economic blockade should be a 
lesson for a broader approach in defining critical infrastructure because of the interdependence of 
cybersecurity with the different infrastructure types. 
It also remains to be seen whether the Qatari CIIP Law will adopt a regulatory framework similar to 
that of the European Union. So far, only the European Union has adopted a regulatory model for crit-
work.
167. Ibid.
168. Qatar Data and Privacy Protection Law, Decree Law No (13) of 2016, available in pdf (English) at Sultan Al-Abdullah 
and Partners https://qatarlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Personal-Data-Privacy-Law-No.-13-of-2016.pdf (accessed 
February 22, 2018).
169. NIAP (n 143).
170. NIAP (n 143).
171. Q-CERT, National Information Assurance Framework, 2014, https://www.scribd.com/document/273021971/Qatar-Na-
tional-Information-Assurance-Framework-Ismael (accessed October 18, 2017). 
172. Q-CERT, Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Interdependency Database, http://www.qcert.org/services/crit-
ical-information-infrastructure-protection-interdependency-database (accessed October 18, 2017).
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ical infrastructure protection under the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(EPCIP).173 The EPCIP legislative approach mandates EU nations to create an Operator Security Plan 
(OSP) for designated European critical infrastructures.174 The OSP must cover the identification of 
important assets, a risk analysis based on major threat scenarios and the vulnerability of each asset, 
and the identification, selection, and prioritization of countermeasures and procedures.175 The Unit-
ed States,176 the United Kingdom,177 and Canada178 have adopted a cooperative framework179 among 
government and critical infrastructure operators. A cooperative framework relies on the adoption by 
operators, rather than a legislatively mandated compliance program, through fostering communica-
tion of best practices.180
A critical infrastructure protection framework designed as a regulatory model similar to the EPCIP 
will certainly make it easier to incorporate a capability maturity model like the proposed Q-C2M2 
with a legal framework. At the very least, Qatar should legislatively mandate the benchmarking of 
critical infrastructure protection and cybersecurity protection. A benchmarking program like the 
proposed Q-C2M2 will help identify both asset and threat-based risks. A Q-C2M2 can help the gov-
ernment better allocate time and resources for developing critical infrastructure and cybersecurity 
protection.  
D. Legal Framework Embedded within the Q-C2M2’s Design
Even without a legislative mandate for adoption, the Q-C2M2 incorporates a legal framework in the 
model’s design under the Understand domain, which includes the Cybergovernance subdomain. Un-
der Cybergovernance, an organization should have a set of activities related to legal and regulatory 
compliance, a domain glaringly missing under the existing NIAM. The Q-C2M2’s Cybergovernance 
subdomain includes the Governance and Business Environment categories under the NIST Framework 
and the Compliance and Financial Resource Management of the CERT-RMM, and combines these 
domains with the Governance, Documentation, and Change Management domains under the NIAP. 
Essentially, the Cybergovernance domain enhances the NIAF’s approach by adding compliance and 
management of regulatory, legal, financial, and strategic organizational needs. 
In cybersecurity capacity building, Palmer suggests capacity-building training to support develop-
ment of internal legislative, procedural, and technical operational capabilities.181 In other words, 
cybergovernance and development of cybersecurity capability maturity must include a legislative 
framework. Cybergovernance should include managers complying with procedural frameworks in 
173. Miron and Muita (n 10). See Council Directive (EC) 2008/114 on European Critical Infrastructures, 2008, http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0075:0082:EN:PDF (accessed October 17, 2017); Com-
mission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on a European Programme for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection COM, 2006, 786 final, December 12, 2006, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=COM:2006:0786:FIN:EN:PDF (accessed October 17, 2017); European Commission, Critical Infrastructure, Migration 
and Home Affairs, July 20, 2014, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/critical-in-
frastructure_en (accessed October 17, 2017). 
174. Council Directive (EC) 2008/114 (n 209).
175. Ibid.; Madelene Lindström & Stefan Olsson, The European programme for critical infrastructure protection, in Stefan 
Olsson (ed), Crisis Management in the European Union (Springer, 2009).
176. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, NIPP 2013: Partnering for critical infrastructure security and resilience, 2013, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/NIPP%202013_Partnering%20for%20Critical%20Infrastructure%20Secu-
rity%20and%20Resilience_508_0.pdf (accessed October 17, 2017).
177. See Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure, Critical National Infrastructure, 2017, https://www.cpni.gov.uk/
critical-national-infrastructure-0 (accessed October 17, 2017). 
178. National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure, Canada, 2009, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/srtg-crt-
cl-nfrstrctr/srtg-crtcl-nfrstrctr-eng.pdf (accessed October 17, 2017).
179. Miron and Muita (n 10).
180. Ibid.
181. Palmer (n 160) 16. 
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the Q-C2M2.182 Likewise, higher-level managers should incorporate a process for legal compliance 
similar to the CERT-RMM, including identifying and documenting legal and regulatory compliance 
processes and practices. Legal and regulatory compliance should be included as a process under all 
the domains. The organization should task a legal team to oversee compliance under each domain 
through periodic policy, practice, and process reviews. Such a legal audit would be compatible with 
the Qatari cybersecurity framework’s audit and certification process incorporated in the NIAP. 
The proposed Q-C2M2 takes into account compliance with existing Qatari cybersecurity laws, with 
specific focus on the Data and Privacy Protection Law.183 The Data and Privacy Protection Law, among 
others, requires controllers of data to review data privacy procedures; to identify the person re-
sponsible for personal data privacy protection; to conduct awareness training; to develop a sound 
internal system for dealing with data breach complaints and personal data management; and to 
conduct audits to determine compliance levels.184 The law provides exemptions, among others, for 
the protection of national and public security and in the investigation of crimes, which means that 
public entities already working to prevent cyberattacks or cybercrimes will likely fall under the 
exemption.185 The Q-C2M2, under the Cybergovernance subdomain, would include compliance activi-
ties on how exempted individuals and organizations may fall within the exemption. Furthermore, for 
individuals and organizations that are not covered by any exemption, the Q-C2M2’s cybergovernance 
subdomain would provide guidance on how to follow data privacy procedures and ensure cyberse-
curity readiness. In other words, the involved operations in the Q-C2M2 should adopt activities that 
include the management of legal and regulatory compliance with attention to protecting civil liber-
ties when conducting cybersecurity operations and activities. 
The Q-C2M2 should also adopt activities that ensure compliance with international law principles, 
such as the applicability of the UN Charter to cyberspace, as recognized by the UN’s Group of Gov-
ernmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the 
Context of International Security (GGE).186 In its consensus report in June 2015, the GGE stated that 
when using information communication technologies (ICTs), states must observe international law 
principles including the peaceful resolution of disputes, state sovereignty, and non-intervention.187 
The GGE also found that international law obligations, such as the obligation to respect and protect 
human rights and free speech, are applicable whenever states use ICTs.188 Interestingly, the UAE and 
Saudi Arabia’s ban of social media speech in countries that show support for Qatar following the 
economic blockade violates the international law obligations to free speech. Additionally, the GGE 
stated that states must not engage in the use of proxies “to commit internationally wrongful acts us-
ing ICTs, and should seek to ensure that their territory is not used by non-State actors to commit such 
182. Ibid. (stating that “[i]nitiatives to combat advanced cyber threat activity must be placed within a solid procedural 
framework.”).
183. Qatar Data and Privacy Protection Law, Decree Law No (13) of 2016, available in pdf (English) at Sultan Al-Abdullah 
and Partners https://qatarlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Personal-Data-Privacy-Law-No.-13-of-2016.pdf (accessed 
February 22, 2018).
184. Ibid.
185. Ibid.
186. United Nations Officer of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), Developments in the field of information and telecommuni-
cations in the context of international security, https://www.un.org/disarmament/topics/informationsecurity/ (accessed 
February 22, 2018); United Nations Secretary General, Report of the group of governmental experts on developments in the 
field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, 2015, available in (English) pdf http://
undocs.org/A/70/174 (accessed February 22, 2018). The GGE was established pursuant to paragraph 4 of General Assembly 
Resolution 68/243. 
187. Ibid.
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acts.”189 Under the Understand domain and Cybergovernance subdomain of the proposed Q-C2M2, in 
the instance of a cyberattack a legal team must advise Qatar on international law compliance and 
the legally appropriate response. 
Conclusion
After a document and comparative analysis of pertinent C2M2 models and the Qatar cybersecurity 
strategy and the NIAP, the author recommends that, at minimum, Qatar should update the NIAP to 
include compliance, financial resources management, protective technology, awareness and train-
ing, mitigation, analysis, improvement, and communication. Qatar should also mandate a minimum 
level of cybersecurity capability with a means for measuring the cybersecurity maturity level for 
public and private entities, with utmost priority given to critical infrastructures including organiza-
tions in the food, transportation, finance, communication, media, and energy sectors. The author 
recommends the adoption of the proposed Q-C2M2 as a means of measuring and enforcing compli-
ance. Qatar could adopt the Q-C2M2 without further need for new legislation, as it falls within the 
scope of existing policies, standards, and legislation or it can be introduced as an amendment to 
existing legislation.
The proposed Q-C2M2 does not aim to be a full proposal with ironed ironed-out detailed activities. 
Rather, the proposed Q-C2M2 provides a workable framework that Qatari cybersecurity stakeholders 
can use in working together to identify fully researched and negotiated activities that fall under the 
Q-C2M2’s domains and subdomains. Most importantly, the Q-C2M2 stems from a methodologically 
derived comparison of existing C2M2s and the Qatari cybersecurity framework with an emphasis on 
the NIAM domains. This paper proposes a legislative framework that will enhance the development, 
sustainability, and agility of the Qatari cybersecurity framework. The blockade of Qatar has been a 
lesson of self-sufficiency, resilience, and the importance of building measures for security, of which 
cybersecurity plays a pivotal role. 
Bibliography
Adler, Richard, A dynamic capability maturity model for improving cyber security, 2013 IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST) (2014). 
Arnold, Tom, Hadeel Al Sayegh, and Tom Finn, UPDATE 3-Qatari riyal under pressure as Saudi, UAE 
banks delay Qatar deals, CNBC, June 6, 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/06/reuters-america-
update-3-qatari-riyal-under-pressure-as-saudi-uae-banks-delay-qatar-deals.html.
Atoum, Issa, Ahmed Ali Otoom, and Amer Abu Ali, A holistic cyber security implementation frame-
work, 22 Information Management & Computer Security 3, 251–264(14) (2014).
Barclay, Corlane, Sustainable security advantage in a changing environment: The Cybersecurity Ca-
pability Maturity Model (CM2), Proceedings of the 2014 ITU Kaleidoscope Academic Conference: 
Living in a converged world – Impossible without standards? (July 21, 2014).
BBC, Qatar crisis: What you need to know, BBC News, July 19, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/
189. Ibid. 
57رطق ةعماج رش�ن راد ،راش�لحاب ص�الخا عبارلا ددعلا ،2018 دلجلما ،نوناقلل ةيلودلا ةلجلما
world-middle-east-40173757. 
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(eds), 6th International Security Forum: Proceedings of the Conference (Peter Lang, 2005).
European Commission, Critical Infrastructure, Migration and Home Affairs, July 20, 2014, https://
ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/critical-infrastructure_en.
Ferraiolo, Karen, The Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM), Interna-
tional Systems Security Engineering Association (ISSEA), 2000, https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/
publications/conference-paper/2000/10/19/proceedings-of-the-23rd-nissc-2000/documents/pa-
pers/916slide.pdf.
Fetais, Noora, director of KINDI Computer Research Center, Qatar University, email correspondence 
(October 19, 2017) (copy on file with the author).
Financial Times, The blockade against Qatar damages all sides, July 23, 2017, https://www.ft.com/
content/213cfae6-6e28-11e7-bfeb-33fe0c5b7eaa?mhq5j=e7.
Framework Nazionale per la Cyber Security, Il cybersecurity report 2016, 2016, http://www.cyber-
securityframework.it/. 
González-Rojas, Oscar, Dario Correal, and Manuel Camargo, ICT capabilities for supporting collab-
orative work on business processes within the digital content industry, 80 Computers in Industry 
16–29 (2016).
Gupta, Rahul, The challenges and recommended steps to improve cybersecurity within industrial 
control systems, Wood Group Mustang, Petroleum and Power Automation (PPA) Meet, New Delhi, 
India, 2016, https://www.woodgroup.com/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/3143/2016-04-ISA-Delhi-
power-and-petroleum.pdf.
59رطق ةعماج رش�ن راد ،راش�لحاب ص�الخا عبارلا ددعلا ،2018 دلجلما ،نوناقلل ةيلودلا ةلجلما
Harb, Imad K., Stupendous hubris…and its damage, in George Doumar et al., Crisis in the Gulf Co-
operation Council: Challenges and Prospects (Arab Center Washington DC, 2017).
Ibrahim, Jamaludin et al., A cybersecurity capability maturity model based on Maqasid Shari’ah 
(MS-C2M2), International Conference on Maqasid Al-Shari’ah in Public Policy and Governance (IAIS 
Malaysia, 2015). 
International Telecommunications Union, Cyberwellness profile: Qatar, 2014, http://www.itu.int/
en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Documents/Country_Profiles/Qatar.pdf.
International Telecommunications Union, Cyberwellness profile: Qatar, in Global Cybersecurity Index 
& Cyberwellness Profiles: Report, 382, ABI Research, 2015, https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/
opb/str/D-STR-SECU-2015-PDF-E.pdf.
International Telecommunications Union, Global Cybersecurity Index 2017, 2017, https://www.itu.
int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-GCI.01-2017-PDF-E.pdf. Kiblawi, Tamar et al., Qatar rift: Saudi, 
UAE, Bahrain, Egypt cut diplomatic ties, CNN, July 27, 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/05/
middleeast/saudi-bahrain-egypt-uae-qatar-terror/index.html.
Krutz, Ronald L., Methodology for assessing the maturity and capability of an organization’s comput-
er forensics processes, U.S. Patent Application 10/952537 (2006).
Lahrmann, Gerrit et al., Inductive design of maturity models: Applying the Rasch algorithm for 
design science research, Service-Oriented Perspectives: Design Science Research, 176–191 (Springer, 
2011).
Li, Xiao-Juan, and Huang Li-Zhen, Vulnerability and interdependency of critical infrastructure: A 
review, Third International Conference on Infrastructure Systems and Services: Next Generation 
Infrastructure Systems for Eco-Cities (INFRA) (2010).
Lindström, Madelene, and Stefan Olsson, The European programme for critical infrastructure pro-
tection, in Stefan Olsson (ed.), Crisis Management in the European Union (Springer, 2009).
Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, Information Security Framework for School 
Networks, 2014, http://www.qcert.org/library/36.
Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, National Information Assurance Manual, 
2014, http://www.qcert.org/library/36.
Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, National Information Assurance Policy, 
2014, http://www.qcert.org/library/36.
Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, National Information Classification Policy, 
2014, http://www.qcert.org/library/36.
Ministry of Transport and Communications, Guidance for Assurance Manual v. 2.0, 2014, http://www.
motc.gov.qa/sites/default/files/guidance_nia_manual-v2.0_english_1.pdf.
60 رطق ةعماج رش�ن راد ،راش�لحاب ص�الخا عبارلا ددعلا ،2018 دلجلما ،نوناقلل ةيلودلا ةلجلما
Ministry of Information and Communications Technology and Q-CERT, National Information Assur-
ance Manual, 2014, http://www.qcert.org/sites/default/files/public/documents/nia_policy__man-
ual_english_v2.0_0.pdf.
Miron, Walter, and Kevin Muita, Cybersecurity capability maturity models for providers of critical 
infrastructure, 4(10) Tech Innovation Management Rev 33–39 (2014).
National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE), Cybersecurity capability maturity model, Oc-
tober 3, 2012, https://www.tdisecurity.com/about-tdi/cybersecurity_education.pdf.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Framework for improving
critical infrastructure cybersecurity, February 12, 2014, https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework.
National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure, Canada, 2009, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/
rsrcs/pblctns/srtg-crtcl-nfrstrctr/srtg-crtcl-nfrstrctr-eng.pdf.
O’Leary, Zina, The Essential Guide to Doing Your Research Project (2nd ed., SAGE Publications, 
2014).
Osborne, Charlie, Script kiddies delight at ‘easy’ hack which caused Qatar diplomatic crisis, Zero 
Day Net, June 8, 2017, http://www.zdnet.com/article/it-was-easy-to-cause-the-qatar-diplomatic-
crisis/.
  
Palmer, Adam, A model framework for successful cybersecurity capacity building, J of Internet L 15 
(2016). 
Paulk, Mark C. et al., Capability maturity model version 1.1, 10(4) IEEE Software 18–27 (1993).
Qatar Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Law (CIIP) (not yet published). 
Qatar Cybercrime Law, Decree Law No (14) of 2014, available in pdf (Arabic) at International Labour 
Organization (ILO) http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=100242.
Qatar Data and Privacy Protection Law, Decree Law No (13) of 2016, available in pdf (English) at 
Sultan Al-Abdullah and Partners https://qatarlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Personal-Da-
ta-Privacy-Law-No.-13-of-2016.pdf.
Qatar Decree Law No (16) of 2010 on the Promulgation of the Electronic Commerce and Transac-
tions Law, available in English at Al Meezan http://www.almeezan.qa/LawPage.aspx?id=2678&lan-
guage=en.
Qatar National Cybersecurity Strategy, May 2014, http://www.motc.gov.qa/en/documents/docu-
ment/national-cyber-security-strategy.
Q-CERT, About Q-CERT, 2017, http://www.qcert.org/about-q-cert.
61رطق ةعماج رش�ن راد ،راش�لحاب ص�الخا عبارلا ددعلا ،2018 دلجلما ،نوناقلل ةيلودلا ةلجلما
Q-CERT, Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Interdependency Database, http://www.
qcert.org/services/critical-information-infrastructure-protection-interdependency-database.
Q-CERT, National Information Assurance Policy Ver 2.0 Control Types, http://www.qcert.org/sites/
default/files/public/documents/cs-niap_controls_classification_eng_v1.0.pdf.
Q-CERT, Qatar National Information Assurance Framework 2014, available in English, https://www.
scribd.com/document/273021971/Qatar-National-Information-Assurance-Framework-Ismael.
Rea-Guamán, Angel Marcelo et al., Comparative study of cybersecurity capability maturity models, 
in Antonia Mas et al. (eds), Software Process Improvement and Capability Determination, SPICE 
Conference 2017, Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol. 770 (Springer, 2017).
Rea-Guamán, Angel Marcelo et al., Maturity models in cybersecurity: A systematic review, 2017 12th 
Iberian Conference on Information Systems and Technologies (CISTI) (2017).
Rogers, Everett M., Diffusion of Innovations (Free Press, 1983).
Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority (SAMA), Cyber security framework v. 1 (May 2017), available in 
(English) pdf at http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/Laws/BankingRules/SAMA%20Cyber%20Security%20
Framework.pdf.
Siponen, Mikko, Towards maturity of information security maturity criteria: Six lessons learned 
from software maturity criteria, 10(5) Inf Management & Comp Security 210–224 (2002).
Stewart, David, Qatar’s resilience – a lesson for all on how to respond positively to a crisis, Gulf 
Times, October 10, 2017, http://www.gulf-times.com/story/566847/Qatar-s-resilience-a-lesson-
for-all-on-how-to-resp.
Sultanate of Oman, Information Technology Authority, Annual report 2015, available in (English) pdf 
at https://www.ita.gov.om/ITAPortal/MediaCenter/Document_detail.aspx?NID=115.
United Nations Officer of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), Developments in the field of information 
and telecommunications in the context of international security, https://www.un.org/disarmament/
topics/informationsecurity/.
United Nations Secretary General, Report of the group of governmental experts on developments 
in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, 2015, 
available in (English) pdf http://undocs.org/A/70/174.
 
U.S. Department of Energy, Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (ES-C2M2) 
v.1.1., February 2014, https://energy.gov/oe/cybersecurity-capability-maturity-model-c2m2-pro-
gram/electricity-subsector-cybersecurity (“U.S. DoE ES-C2M2”).
U.S. Department of Energy, Oil and Natural Gas Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model 
(ONG-C2M2) v.1.1., February 2014, https://energy.gov/oe/cybersecurity-capability-maturity-mod-
62 رطق ةعماج رش�ن راد ،راش�لحاب ص�الخا عبارلا ددعلا ،2018 دلجلما ،نوناقلل ةيلودلا ةلجلما
el-c2m2-program/oil-and-natural-gas-subsector-cybersecurity (“U.S. DoE ONG-C2M2”).
U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity Capability 
Maturity Model (C2M2) v.1.1., February 2014, https://energy.gov/oe/services/cybersecurity/cyber-
security-capability-maturity-model-c2m2-program/cybersecurity.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, NIPP 2013: Partnering for critical infrastructure security 
and resilience, 2013, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/NIPP%202013_Partner-
ing%20for%20Critical%20Infrastructure%20Security%20and%20Resilience_508_0.pdf.
Uzoka, Faith-Michael E., A CMM assessment of information systems maturity levels in Botswana, 16 
MIS Rev 53–84 (2010). 
Vijayan, Jaikumar, Web site offline as police, FBI investigate $10M
extortion bid, Computer World, May 7, 2009, www.computerworld.com/s/article/9132678/Web_
site_offline_as_police_FBI_investigate_10M_extortion_bid. 
Wendler, Roy, The maturity of maturity model research: A systematic mapping study, 54(12) Infor-
mation and Software Tech 1317–1339 (2012).
Westcott, Ben, Richard Roth, and Ralph Ellis, Qatar says embargoing nations behind news agen-
cy hack, CNN, July 27, 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/07/20/middleeast/qatar-ambassa-
dor-un-demands/index.html.
 
Yusta, Jose M., Gabriel J.Correa, and Roberto Lacal-Arántegui, Methodologies and applications for 
critical infrastructure protection: State-of-the-art, 39(10) Energy Policy 6100–611 (2011).
